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Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era:
Relations with Turkic Republics
Selami Erbaş
Supervisor: Dr. Paul Williams
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of newly independent 
Turkic states in Caucasus and Central Asia presented both important opportunities and 
serious challenges for Turkey in terms of defining its role and identity in the emerging 
international system of the post-Cold War era. At the beginning of 1990s. when five 
Turkic republics, namely Azerbaijan. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan, gained their independence from the folrmer Soviet Union, there was a 
great euphoria and optimism in Turkey that 2T‘ century would be the century of the 
Turkic world. However, after several years have passed since the independence 
declarations of the republics, this enthusiasm has had to be replaced with a realistic 
understanding that national self-interests rather than cultural and ethnic solidarity 
determine foreign policy decisions on both sides. By analysing different aspects of 
Turkey’s relations with the Turkic republics during the first decade of latter’s 
independence, this thesis tries to explain why Turkey has not been able to fully realize 
its expectations despite its great historical and cultural ties with the region and at the 
same time looks for whether there have been any changes in the basic orientation and 
the style of Turkish foreign policy during the post-Cold War era.
Ill
ÖZET
Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dönemde Türkiye:
Türki Cumhuriyetlerle İlişkiler
Selami Erbaş
Danışman: Dr. Paul Williams
Sovyetler Birliği’nin dağılması ve Güney Kafkasya ile Orta Asya’da yeni 
bağımsızlığını kazanan Türki Cumhuriyetlerin ortaya çıkması Türkiye’ye Soğuk 
Savaş sonrası dönemin yeni oluşan uluslararası sisteminde rolünü ve kimliğini 
tanımlaması açısından hem önemli imkanlar hem de ciddi tehlikeler sunmuştur. 1990’ 
larm başında beş Türki Cumhuriyet, yani Azerbeycan, Kazakistan, Kırgizistan, 
Türkmenistan ve Özbekistan, eski Sovyetler Birliği’nden bağımsızlıklarını kazanınca 
Türkiye’de 21. yüzyılın Türk dünyasının yüzyılı olacağına ilişkin büyük bir heyecan 
ve iyimserlik mevcuttu. Ancak, sözkonusu cumhuriyetlerin bağımsızlık ilanlarını 
takiben geçen yıllar sonunda bu heyecan yerini kültürel ve etnik birlikten ziyade 
ulusal çıkarların her iki tarafta da dış politika kararlarını belirlediği yönündeki 
gerçekçi anlayışa bırakmıştır. İşte bu tez, Türkiye’nin Türki Cumhuriyetlerle 
bağımsızlıklarının ilk 9 yılı süresince sürdürdüğü ilişkilerin değişik yönlerini analiz 
ederek, Türkiye’nin bölgeyle olan büyük tarihsel ve kültürel bağlarına rağmen niçin 
beklentilerini gerçekleştiremediğini açıklamaya çalışmakta ve Soğuk Savaş sonrası 
dönemde Türk dış politikasının temel yöneliminde ve stilinde herhangi bir değişiklik 
olup olmadığını incelemektedir.
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INTRODUCTION
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of newly independent 
Turkic states in Caucasus and Central Asia have brought about important opportunities 
and challenges for Turkey in terms of defining its role and identity in the emerging 
international environment of the post-Cold War era. Turkey has responded to these 
opportunities and challenges by introducing more activist foreign policies compared to 
the past since drastic changes in international system and fundamental developments in 
its own domestic climate made it impossible for Turkey to follow a traditional foreign 
policy.
At the beginning of 1990s when five Turkic republics namely, Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, gained their independence from 
the old So\'iet Union, there was a great euphoria and optimism in Turkey that the 21^ ' 
century would be the century of Turkic world through the expected establishment of 
cordial relations between Turkey and the new republics particularly in political and 
economic terms. It was a foregone conclusion that Central Asia and Azerbaijan would 
become Turkey’s sphere of influence. Moreover, Turkey’s active engagement in the 
former Soviet republics initially led to speculations over a possible reorientation of 
Turkey’s foreign policy eastward in a substantial diversion from its western vocation as a 
reaction to its continued exclusion from the EC, along with assertions of reemergence of 
pan-Turkism.
However, after several years have passed since the independence declarations of 
the republics, initial optimism has had to be replaced with a realistic understanding that 
self-interests rather than cultural and ethnic solidarity determines foreign policy decisions
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on both sides. Moreover,Turkey’s Western-oriented foreign policy have proved to remain 
still firm. By analyzing Turkey’s regional and international position in the aftermath of 
the end of the Cold War, and different components and aspects of Turkey’s relations with 
the Turkic republics during the first decade of the post-Cold War period, this thesis tries 
to explain why Turkey has not yet been able to fully realize its expectations despite its 
great historical and cultural ties with the region, and looks over whether there have been 
any changes in the basic orientation and of Turkish foreign policy.
This thesis comprises four chapters. Following introduction, the first chapter 
examines the nature and evolution of historical interaction between western Turks of 
Anatolia and Eastern Turkic people of Caucasus and Central Asia until the end of the 
Cold War. It gives an account of pan-Turkist movements of the late Ottoman period, 
Ataturk’s legacy and the nature of Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War period. 
The second chapter starts with an assessment of Turkey’s regional and international 
position in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War, and evaluates Turkey’s 
initial reactions to the post-Cold War politics both as relief and anxiety. It emphasizes not 
only the momentous changes at the international level emanating fi'om the end of the 
East-West conflict, but also fundamental developments in Turkish domestic scene as 
those factors necessitating a reformulation of Turkish foreign policy. In this context, then 
it describes Turkey’s initial responses to the emergence of Turkic world firstly in the 
form of caution, but then one of euphoria and great enthusiasm and explains the reasons 
behind the latter.
The third chapter analyzes Turkey’s relations with newly independent Turkic 
republics during the first decade of the post-Cold War period. The chapter firstly
identifies Turkish interests and concerns involved in establishing and maintaining good 
relations with the republics. Then, it distinguishes between various types of Turkish 
activities in Azerbaijan and Turkic republics of Central Asia. The chapter also provides 
an assessment of Turkey’s vision and strategy regarding its relations with the republics, 
and examines the evolution of Turkish policy towards the Turkic republics. The fourth 
chapter focuses on the reasons behind non-fulfilment of initial Turkish expectations and 
distinguishes between several challenges and impediments for Turkish influence in the 
Caucasus and Central Asia. It emphasizes especially the Russian factor in Turco-Turkic 
relationship by arguing that Turkey’s domestic and economic constraints and the 
republics’ own structural economic and military dependence on Russia lead both sides to 
avoid antagonizing Russia by establishing strong and decisive steps for cooperation. The 
thesis ends with important concluding remarks about Turkey’s relations with the Turkic 
republics with an overall perspective of Turkish foreign policy behaviour and orientation 
during the post-Cold War era.
CHAPTER I
TURKEY AND TURKIC PEOPLE UNTIL THE END OF THE COLD
WAR
l.l.O rigins of Turkic Peoples
Scholarly consensus proposes that the first identifiable Turkic people can be 
traced back to the second millennium BC in the area around present-day Mongolia. 
(Roux, 1993:1-30) The Great Wall of China was built in the third century BC to prevent 
Hsiung-nu, a Turkic people and ancestors of Huns, from intruding towards the south to 
the heartland of China. The first people to be known as the Turks, called Tirkuu in 
Chinese sources, emerged out from the Altai Mountains in mid-sixth century. (Menges, 
1962:24-27) Following the Chinese invasions, Turks migrated in waves from the depths 
of eastern Asia to spread civilization across Central Asia, the Middle East and the Indian 
subcontinent during the period of Dark Ages in Europe, leaving behind branches of 
Turkic tribes in areas of what is now called Central Asia, where the tenth-century 
domination of Samanid empire had left a lasting imprint of Persian influence on an 
increasing Turkicized population. In the 8“’ and 9'** centuries, both the original Persian 
tribes and some Turkic groups were subject to Arab conquest, so that by the AD 716, the 
south of the Syr Darya River was converted to Islam. (Menges, 1962:88) But at the 
beginning of 13'** century, before intermingling of sedentary population with the Persian 
and Turkic peoples, the region was subjugated by the Mongol Hordes of Genghiz Khan, 
descendants of which formed the Golden Horde later. In the late 14'*' century, Timur lane 
succeeded in forming an empire controlling Central Asia, Persia and Anatolia for a short 
period of time, after which, especially in the beginning of IS'*' century contacts between
Central Asian people, and their co-religionists and co-ethnics elsewhere ceased, bringing 
about steady cultural, political an economic decline of the region under serious isolation.
As other Turkic groups from further east came into Central Asia, the Oghuz tribes 
had migrated further West, actually moving out of Central Asia at the end of the 10'*’ 
century so that the famous Turkic groups, the Seljuks and the Ottomans, were later 
produced from this process of Western thrust. Since then, the Oghuz tribes and their 
descendants lost their strong links with these Turkic tribes, who remained in Central 
Asia. Since the beginning of 15''’ century, when Ottoman Turks took the full control of 
Anatolia, Turks experienced a course of history quite apart from that of Turkic tribes 
remaining in Central Asia.
The Oghuz Turks who migrated to Anatolia mixed with Arabic and Balkan 
peoples, Greeks, Bulgars and Serbs (Davison, 1968:20,24) so that Mediterranean 
influence replaced Altaic features as the dominant aspect of their ethnic make-up. 
(Menges, 1962:21) As the Ottoman Turks absorbed the ethnic features of those they 
conquered and the Central Asian Turkic tribes came to resemble the ethnicity of their 
conquerors, namely the Mongols and Chinese, the ethnic-anthropological distinctions 
between western Turks of Anatolia and eastern Turks of Central Asia diverged centuries 
ago. (Carley, 1995:174) Moreover, in addition to their separate ethnic development, the 
historical experiences of the Central Asian and Anatolian peoples did not overlap much, 
in that compared to nearly total isolation of the Central Asia, the Ottoman Turks were 
under the weight and competition of European influence as a major European power 
especially after the conquest of Constantinople in 1453. In that context, it has been 
argued that the fruits of civilization were originally brought to Central Asia by the
Persians in the 9'*' and lO'*’ centuries rather than Turks, and that the region remained 
under Persian cultural influence until the 19''’ century. (Hunter, 1992:11)
The establishment of Muscovy’s foothold in Northern Caucasus after the defeat of 
the Tatar remnants of Golden Horde in the mid-16"’ century prompted the Ottoman Turks 
and their Tatar allies to prevent Muscovy control of the strategically important territories 
near the Don and Volga rivers with the hopes of opening a channel between the Black 
Sea and Caspian Sea. Once they failed to stop Muscovy’s advance, even the remaining 
minor contacts between Anatolian Turkey and the Turkic people remaining in Central 
Asia were cut and Ottomans diverted their attention more towards the Balkans and the 
Middle East, and had only minimal interaction with Eastern Turkic peoples of Central 
Asia, who became divided under the khanates until their final absorption into the Russian 
orbit by the late 19''’ century in a context of instability and fragmentation of power there. 
Actually in the second half of the 19'*’ century, after Russian troops moved southwards to 
capture Tashkent and Samarkand in 1865 and 1868 respectively, the Emirate of Bukhara 
in 1868 and Khiva in 1873 became Russian protectorates, and Khanate of Kokand was 
annexed in 1876. (Akiner, 1994:10)
1.2. Pan-Turkism and Reform Movements
The lack of interest in developments in Central Asia can be explained in part by 
the fact that unlike parts of Transcaucasus, Central Asia had never been part of the 
Ottoman Empire. But, though not linked by a common political authority, during the 19''’ 
century, both Ottoman and Turkic reformers in Russia drew closer on the basis of Islam 
and then nationalism. Renewed interest of western Turks in the Turkic peoples of Central
Asia only took place in the late 19‘'' century with the emergence of Pan-Turkism as a 
movement promoting the unity of the Turkic peoples of the world, located mainly in the 
Ottoman and Russian empires, despite the ethnic disparateness and historical divergence 
existing between them. Muslim immigrants from the Russian Empire were particularly 
important in helping diffuse Pan-Turkist ideas. For example, Yusuf Akcura, a Tatar of 
Kazan, arrived in Istanbul in 1908 just after, the Young Turk revolution in order to 
establish an interchange between Turkey inside and outside the Ottoman State through 
making Turk Ocagi newspaper a window on Central Asia. (Hyman, 1997:342) Having 
been introduced by Crimean Tatars who had fled from Russia to Ottoman Empire to 
escape repression, pan-Turkism emerged as a reaction to separatist nationalisms of non- 
Turkish ethnic elements, along with continuous weakening and withdrawal in front of 
European powers as well as belligerent Russian- instigated pan-Slavism. (Carley, 
1995:175) In this period, pan-Turkism had potent appeal. The enthusiasm for building 
links between ‘one hundred million blood brothers’ was reflected in Ziya Gokalp’s poem, 
Turan (1911);
‘The fatherland for Turks is not Turkey nor yet Turkestan,
The fatherland is a vast and eternal land: Turan!”
But in his book. Principles of Turkism, Gokalp had indicated more caution and declared 
the immediate goal to be leading cultural unity of Oghuz and Turkmen peoples alone and 
excluding others. (Hyman, 1997:342)
Especially during the wars waged by the Ottoman Empire in early 20‘*' century, 
political pan-Turkism was regarded by many Turkish intellectuals as the only viable 
alternative to an Empire doomed to fragmentation by the centrifugal activities of 
separatist national movements among the non-Turkish groups. The scenario envisioned
was another Empire, still including as much of the Ottoman territory as was possible, but 
strengthened by the annexation of the lands inhabited by Turkish groups. (Landau, 
1988:3) After coming to power with 1908 revolution, in an attempt to save the empire 
from imminent dismemberment, Young Turks especially became attracted, with the 
eruption of the World War I. to the idea which had as its goal the establishment of some 
form of union of Turkic peoples, entailing a political union or empire, or taking the shape 
of a looser cultural association or common wealth. (Winrow, 1998:95) Enver Pasha died 
in Central Asia in 1922 when fighting to realize the pan-Turkic dream at the side of 
Basmachi rebels against newly imposed communist rule of Moscow. (Winrow, 1995:7) 
Carley argued:
“In aiming to unite in some form the world’s Turkic peoples, the movement ought to bring into a 
Turkish empire “peoples who were in fact widely scattered geographically, had conflicting goals 
and interests at the time, and who were at varying degrees of development and civilisation. Pan- 
Turkism hoped to cut through numerous layers of the differing cultures that had settled over these 
vast areas from Turkey to Central Asia, including mixtures of Persian. Islamic and Arabic, to 
combine all the Turkic-speaking peoples into one supranational nation; yet in the end, it struggled 
in vain against the strength of these differences.” (Carley, 1995:176)
Similarly, Czaplicka wrote:
'To speak of the Osmanlis (Ottomans) and the Turanian Turks (of Central Asia) as a racial and 
cultural unity would be by a stroke of the pen, or by means of a propagandist pamphlet to wipe 
away all in the invasions, migrations, massacres and fusions which for t%senty centuries played 
havoc with that part of the world. The fact remains that if there is no other community than a 
distant relationship in language, there need be no community of interests at all.” (Czaplicka, 
1918:108-109)
On the other side, throughout Central Asia in the 19‘'' century there was 
considerable prestige of Ottoman Turkey known as Dowlat-i Rum, respect and sympathy 
for which as the greatest surviving independent Muslim Empire steadily grew among 
Turco-Muslim intellectuals whose people had become colonial subjects of European 
empires. (Hyman, 1997:342) Turkic element in Central Asia had begun to sharpen its 
political consciousness in the 19'*’ century, as the caliphate in Istanbul became the symbol
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of Muslim unity and resistance to foreign occupation. The Ottoman State, initiating a 
series of reforms culminating in the adoption of a constitution and parliament in 1876, 
became the symbol of modernity and progress for Russia’s Turco-Muslim intellectuals. 
In this spirit, being galvanised under increasing czarist repression, a group of Tatar 
intellectuals in the late 19“’ century led by Ismail Bey Gaspirali promoted the unity of all 
of Russia’s Muslims and influenced the development of a reform movement of western- 
oriented Islamic nationalists known as Jadids who spoke more often of a federation with 
Russia on equal terms or independence, without no discussion of political unity with 
ethnic groups outside the Russian empire including those in the Ottoman empire, while 
pan-Turkists in the latter and some among Russia’s Turkic reformers adopted pan-Turkic 
nationalism, which envisaged of one Turkic-Turkish nation, including Turkic peoples and 
Anatolian Turks, sharing a common culture, language, history and homeland. (Karpat, 
1979)
This interaction, shown in the spreading of the ideas of ethnic nationalism, Pan- 
Turkism and even pan-Islamism came to a sudden end in the period 1917-1920 and the 
two groups remained almost totally isolated from each other until the disintegration of the 
USSR. (Karpat, 1992-4:103) Even during the collapse of two large empires containing 
Turkic peoples. Pan-Turkism could not obtain popular allegiance due to many realities 
working against it.
After the establishment of the Turkish republic in 1923, the pan-Turkist 
movement there became the cause of a few extreme fringe under the authority of Ataturk 
who severed ties between would-be new Turkish nation and the rest of the Turkic world 
in order to focus the overall attention on consolidating Turkish republic based on a new
Turkish nationalism. Accordingly, after the incorporation of Central Asia into the USSR 
in order to prevent the development of a broad-based Turkic ethnic identity among the 
Turkic peoples in the newly established Soviet Russian state, the Soviet officials 
employed a variety of administrative, cultural and educational policies, including division 
of historic Turkestan into separate republics in 1924 and promotion of separate literary 
languages. (Karpat, 1979; Akiner, 1994:8) Fearful of pan-Turkism, they pursued divide- 
and-rule tactics towards the Turkic peoples and exerted to minimize the contacts between 
Turkey and Turco-Muslim peoples. (Winrow, 1994:10) Turkic peoples in the newly 
established Soviet Russian empire, with Stalin’s deliberate policy of ‘divide and rule’ and 
artificial creation of new territorial administrative units in 1924, developed distinct ethnic 
identities of their own during more than three generations as such Kazakhs, Kyrgyzs, 
Turkmens and Uzbeks.
1.3. Ataturk’s Legacy
Ever since its establishment, Turkey’s foreign policy had been influenced by the 
principles laid down by Ataturk: the goal of establishing a nation-state of 19'*’ century 
model with a coinciding effort to create a favourable position for Turkey in the 
international scene, continuing observance and application of the principle of ‘peace at 
home peace in the world’ and determined effort to elevate Turkey to the level of 
contemporary civilization. Basically no Turkish government implemented policies that 
ran counter to these Kemalist principles. (Sander, 1993:34) Republican leaders, conscious 
of the dangers of any kind of pan-Turkic adventures like the one pursued in the last days 
of the Ottoman Empire, had been quite categorical in their refusal to show any interest in
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so-called ‘outside Turks’ especially within the SU. ‘Turkey has long been steeped in its 
own Ataturkist legacy, pointedly eschewing any interest in pan-Turkism because it was 
regarded as distracting, unrealistic and dangerous given the character of Soviet power.” 
(Fuller, 1990:64)
Although weakened, the Ottoman Empire was still one of the big powers at the 
beginning of the 20“’ century. But, the new Turkish republic had to learn to adjust to 
being a secondary power after an imperial past (Armaoglu, 1988:307-360) in that its 
desire to be part of Western schemes along with adopting a less glorious role in 
international affairs began to shape the foreign policy of Turkey after 1923. (Deringil, 
1992:1) Unlike Hitler’s, Mussolini’s and Stalin’s policies, Kemalist foreign policy was 
essentially pacifist, nourishing no territorial and political ambitions at the expense of the 
others. During the interwar period, it was possible for Turkey to solve some of the 
questions such as those of Straits and Sanjak of Alexandretta by force or fait accompli 
without waiting for an opportunity to negotiate them, but Turkey dismissed sch 
adventures. (Sander, 1993:36) Without plans to restore Ottoman empire, but with the 
principle of ‘peace at home peace in the world’, the main desire of Ataturk’s Turkey was 
its territorial integrity and independence, as reflected in the statement that ‘Turkey does 
not desire an inch of foreign territory but will not give up an inch of what she holds.” 
(Kinross, 1993:458) Ataturk’s endeavours to initiate socio-economic reforms necessary 
for modernization required a realistic but moderate foreign policy, avoiding adventurous 
attitudes and careless initiatives in order to have a breathing space to focus on the internal 
reconstruction of the Republic. (Sander, 1993:38)
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Atatürk rejected the illusory ideas of pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism and did not 
built Turkish nationalism on religion or race. Instead of religion, Atatürk defined an 
entity around which people must unify, namely ‘Turkishness’, which was defined 
exclusively with reference to Turks living within Turkey. While putting the centrality of 
being a Turkish citizen with no account of differences in ethnicity and religion, especially 
in the initial phase of the foundation of Turkish republic Central Asian origins of Turks 
were overemphasised to overcome the problem of rootlessness of Turkish nation with an 
overreliance on the myths of common ethnic, linguistic and historical origins in Central 
Asia. For example. Sun Language Theory was invented to proclaim Turkish to be the 
origin of all languages and hence to serve as a signifier, meaning that the Turkish nation 
had linguistic, historical and cultural roots. (Alici, 1996:229)
In order to promote the concept of Anatolianism, the idea that the territory known 
as Anatolia within the boundaries of the new Turkish republic was the traditional 
homeland of Turks, historians of Atatürk era emphasized that many Turks had been 
compelled to leave their historical homeland in Central Asia due to drying up of the area. 
In his nation-state building, Atatürk made use of these myths of the origins and roots of 
Anatolian Turks from Central Asia, embellished by such notions that Central Asia was 
the cradle of Turkish civilization and ‘sanctified’ and ‘legendary’ homeland of all Turkic 
peoples, since the Balkans could not be used as a reference point after the traumatic 
withdrawal of Ottoman forces there. Although Turkish nationalism emphasised the pre- 
Islamic history and literature held in common with Central Asia as a denial of vast 
Ottoman heritage, Turkish officials have deemphasized pan-Turkism under the Ataturk’s 
limited conception of national identity and territory. (Sowerwine, 1995:34)
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In addition to Atatürk’s distaste for Pan-Turkism and his desire to consolidate the
newly founded Republic of Turkey, the original rapprochement between Turkey and
Soviet Union in the interwar period led Turkish leadership to ignore the fate of ‘Outside
Turks’ or ‘Dis Turkler’, a term used to cover those various ethnic groups living outside
Anatolia that claimed to be of Turkic origins. (Landau, 1981) In Turkey’s relations with
the Soviet Union, Atatürk followed a policy of abiding by principles of independence and
non-interference in internal affairs. He said "Turkey will try to remain friend with the
Soviet Union, but will not be lived into its trap.” (Bilge, 1997:78) By the treaty signed in
March 1921, Soviet Russia and Turkish government in Ankara agreed to:
"forbid the formation or presence on their territory of organisations and groups claiming to be the 
government of the other country or part of the territory, and also the presence of groups that have 
hostile intentions with regard to the other country”. (Dmytryshyn&Cox, 1987:473-480)
Thus, in return for promise from Moscow not to promote communism in Turkey, Atatürk
pledged not to advocate pan-Turkic elements in the territories under Moscow’s control.
Since then, throughout the Cold War, Turkey sought to avoid antagonizing the SU while
the latter’s leadership still, suspected the possibility of Turkish initiatives to rekindle pan-
Turkist ideas. But, the Kemalist legacy clearly warned Turkish leaders against any type
of pan-Turkic adventures. Atatürk recognised that pan-Turkist policies could only
provoke the formidable power of the Soviet state against Turkey. Instead, Turkey should
spend its energies and time on establishing a relatively small modern nation-state within
realistic borders on the basis of ethically homogeneous Anatolian Turkish nation.
(Bingöl, 1998:4)
Thus, because of the disapproval by new ruling cadre of late Ottoman period’s 
pan-Turkist policies and due to special circumstances of Turkish-Soviet relations between 
the foundation of Turkish republic and World War II, Turkic-speaking communities in
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the USSR had not constituted an important place on Turkey’s foreign policy agenda.
Once they had become divided under five Turkic republics to acquire the status of union
republic, it had already become almost impossible for Turkey, cautious enough, not to
take any initiative to develop special relations with them that might have disturbed its
neighbour, USSR. (Kut, 1996:378) Landau stated that:
“The only viable opportunity for political Pan-Turkism to achieve its irredentist aims was a world 
war.... In the two world wars, Turkey was either the losing or neutral side, and then Turkic 
minorities or majorities within Russia and China as superpowers. Pan-Turkists were always few in 
number and had little success in propagating the their message among the masses...Kemalism stole 
much of the Pan-Turkism’s thunder by advocating pride in Turkish culture and civilization in all 
their manifestations throughout history. The only element which Pan-Turkism could add to this 
was political advocacy of Dis Turkler, this however, was an appeal imbued with dangerous 
irredentism”. (Landau, 1988:4,5)
Nevertheless, since especially 1930s, the ethnic nationalistic element of Turkish 
political culture, reflected in an overemphasis on Central Asian roots to nourish Kemalist 
nationalism, kept ideological baggage of Pan-Turkist ideas to remain alive and sometimes 
to flourish whenever international circumstances became suitable. In this regard, it is 
interesting to note that the periods when Pan-Turkism was suppressed or tolerated at 
home coincided with Turkish leadership’s perception of Soviet threat to Turkey. (Alici, 
1996:230)
Though scrapped, pan-Turkic emotions or nostalgia for a united Turkic world 
were stimulated during World War II by the Germans after their attack on the Soviet 
Union after which pan-Turkist activities in Turkey intensified to the point with the 
declared intent of destroying the SU, liberating the Turks and creating a new Turkish 
state covering mass lands. (Hostler, 1993:132-141) Although Germans could not 
convince the Turkish leadership to get involved in the war on their side, pan-Turkist ideas 
caused a lively debate among some Turkish cadres on whether or not to exploit the 
opportunity. (Landau, 1981:108-115) Among the leading figures attracted by the dream
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of a united Turkic world were Fevzi Çakmak and Sukru Saraçoğlu. Even though some 
attempts were made to persuade top-level decision-makers in Turkey on the behalf of a 
more active policy in favour of ‘slave Turks’ in Russia (Hostler, 1993:134-139), as 
Weisband argued, there was neither pan-Turanian influence in the making of Turkish 
foreign policy nor recognition of pan-Turkism as a national ideology by Turkish 
governments. (Weisband. 1973:237-256) Similarly, Knatchbull-Hugessen pointed out the 
absence of “even the slightest justification for the notion that Turkish government had 
irredentist ambitions in regard to Turkish populations.” (Knatchbull-Hugessen, 1949:170) 
Later, in the second half of 1944 while Turkey was approaching closer to the allies, Inonu 
declared that pan-Turanists were damaging to the existence of the republic and that 
Turkey did not have an adventurist policy, but have historical friendship with the SU. In 
this regard, pan-Turkist activities were banned and the leading advocates were excluded 
from official posts. (Weisband, 1973:242)
1.4. Turkish Foreign Policy during the Cold War
Since its founding, Turkey has tried to keep away from engagements beyond its 
own borders. The main concern of nationalist leadership, namely the preservation of 
achieved borders, has become a major tenet of Turkish foreign policy. This owes much to 
the historical memory of the Ottoman Empire’s receding from the Balkans all throughout 
the 19‘^  century, which had assumed traumatic dimensions after Turco-Russian war of 
1877-1878 and Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 and left behind across the border substantial 
ethnic Turkish and Muslim populations there. In this context, Turkish republic emerged 
as satisfied with the formed status quo and adopted a policy of non-involvement beyond
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its newly established borders by signing the Laussanne Treaty and renouncing previous 
Ottoman efforts to get back at least some of the lost territories or compensate for them by 
attaining new ones in the Caucasus and Central Asia or elsewhere.
Turkish Republic has sided with defenders of status quo given its identity as a 
territorially contested state throughout its history. Between the two world wars, status quo 
was initially threatened by fascist Italy and then by Nazi Germany. (Mango, 1994:10) 
However, the creation of a broader regional balance, a major concern and goal for 
Turkish foreign policy during the interwar period, lost much of its meaning and 
significance when its neighbouring regions became either contested cold War territor>’ 
and dividing line between NATO and Warsaw Pact or absorbed into the USSR. Now, 
with the threat coming from communist Soviet Union, Turkey sought to alleviate the 
threat by seeking like-minded allies.
Turkey’s international position after the World War II was largely a function of 
interdependent factors of economic cooperation, national security and an endeavour to 
reach the level of contemporary western civilisation. (Yilmaz, 1994:91) Actually, Turkish 
foreign policy during the Cold War was determined especially by its geographical 
location as a neighbour of the SU and developments at the international level. At the end 
of the World War II, Turkey felt directly threatened by a traditionally expansionist Soviet 
power. Fear of communism and Soviet territorial demands in 1945 played a critical role 
in compelling Turkey to seek support fi’om the West for its defense, leading Turkey to 
adopt the Truman doctrine in 1948 and Join NATO in 1952. Since then, Turkey was a 
reliable NATO partner as its southeastern pillar and bastion against any possible 
expansion of the USSR towards the Middle East and the Mediterranean. With
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participation in NATO alliance and other western organisations, Turkey’s foreign and 
security policy became dominated by its relations with the United States and Western 
Europe. (Kirisci, 1999:250,251) Throughout the Cold War, being a distant outpost on the 
periphery of western Europe, but ‘an active participant in the Cold War’ (Gurel, 1993:3) 
as a barrier to Soviet expansionism southwards, Turkey’s strategic value was restricted to 
its role as the southern flank within NATO. Turkey was important for NATO only when 
security interests were at stake, as in the cases of Iranian crisis and Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan.
However, Turkey’s international realignment and integration into the Western 
alliance always remained important for a long time both domestically and abroad, since 
Turkey’s close cooperation with the West was designed to serve both sides’ security and 
economic interests and the indispensable project in Turkey of westernisation initiated 
even before the foundation of the Republic in 1923. Despite the emergence of detente 
period after 1960s, reducing the cohesion of NATO alliance, the eruption of Cyprus 
crisis, the US’s reaction in the form of Johnson’s letter to Ankara in 1964 and later in the 
form of arms embargo on Turkey, resulting in growing suspects among Turkish public 
and leadership about US sacrifice of Turkey and provoking some considerations over 
unquestioned reliance on the West, they could not bring about a break with NATO. 
(W.Hale, 1993:232) Later while some critics urged that Turkey should adopt a more 
‘multifaceted’ foreign policy, after Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Iranian 
Revolution raised the value of Turkish-NATO connection to both sides, Turkey’s 
attachment to NATO was reinforced. Nevertheless, as Turkey based overall its foreign 
and security policy within the framework of NATO, Turkey exerted no decisive influence
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on international politics. Though playing an important part in NATO alliance, which was 
of cardial importance to Turkey, Turkey seldom emerged to play independent 
international role and hence remained basically in the ‘backwaters of international 
politics.’ (Kirisci, 1992:1) “Under the given awkward foreign policy circumstances and 
the resultant involvement in the East-West conflict, Turkey did not want or need to play 
an active part in developments; its scope of action had been too restricted.” (Yilmaz, 
1994:92) The few occasions in which Turkey was at the forefront of international politics 
were only in the context of crisis in its relations with Greece and Cyprus.
More or less a consensus exists among many analysts of Turkish foreign policy in 
noting that passivity, caution and adherence to status quo dominated Turkey’s foreign 
policy. Kirisci wrote;
“During the Cold War, the most important goal was to ensure the territorial integrity and security 
of Turkey, assured by Turkey’s membership of NATO and commitment to Western alliance. 
Turkish foreign policy behaviour was relegated to the backwaters of international politics. Turkish 
foreign policy was then almost inevitably destined to become basically passive and reactive."
(Kirisci, 1995:20)
Similarly, Kamran Inan stated that “Turkey was never proactive in foreign affairs, never 
embarks on bilateral and multilateral initiatives, and was driven by a defensive 
psychosis.” (Inan, 1995:42) Accordingly, Frene Vali argued that under ismet Inonu, 
Turkey adopted an “over-cautious and timed posture.” (Vali, 1971:310) While 
“reluctance to take risks and lack of innovation” characterised Turkey’s policy towards 
Greece (Kirisci, 1999:11), it was “cautious even to the point of meekness towards the 
Middle East” (Robins, 1991:27). Thus, what Robins calls “a low key, cautious, diffident 
approach” has marked Turkish foreign policy. (Robins, 1992:85)
Largely Turkey’s common border with the SU accounted for the continuity of 
Ataturkist foreign policy and dominated the arguments as to why Turkey ought to pursue
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a cautious foreign policy behaviour. The perceived Soviet threat was the principal 
guiding factor in Turkish foreign and security policies for more than 40 years since the 
end of the WW II. However, it is also important to note that though at variance with the 
then existing Turkish societal norms, Turkish regime endeavoured to construct an identity 
attuned to international status quo order. "If over the decades, Turkish foreign policy has 
to a remarkable degree, been risk averse, it is because the regime has sought to avoid 
confrontations that could upset the delicate balance it had constructed between itself’, 
(one of modernity, secularism and nationhood) and “society” (one of multicultural and 
religious character). (Barkey, 1995:151)
Therefore in this context, Caucasus and Central Asia, ever since the establishment 
of the Bolshevik Empire and the Turkish Republic, had been almost totally quiescent and 
irrelevant to Turkish interests and concerns. Turkish officials had generally pursued the 
policy set up by Atatürk and had paid little attention to the fate of Turks’ and Turkic 
peoples outside Turkish republic with a few exceptions-Turkish minorities in Cyprus, 
western Thrace and Bulgaria due to vital strategic interests concerned. With the 
reinforced belief, due to the persistence of the Cold War and Soviet military power, in the 
wisdom of strict adherence to Atatürk’s strategy of strengthening Turkish nationalism at 
home while precluding possible irredentist activities concerning outside Turks, Turkish 
leadership avoided similar involvement in the affairs of Soviet Turkic republics until 
1990.
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CHAPTER II
TURKEY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA AND THE EMERGENCE
OF TURKIC WORLD
2.1. The End of the Cold War and its Impact on Turkey
The restructuring of the world order and international system due to rapid 
transformation of international political scene during the last decade have brought about 
drastic shifts at all levels-domestic, national, regional and international. The dramatic 
changes that occurred in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s led to a redefinition of international relations. The collapse of 
communism, dissolution of Warsaw Pact, reunification of Germany, and the 
disintegration of the SU brought more than four decades of East-West rivalry and 
bipolarity to an end. Dissolution of the former Soviet empire, both internal and external, 
upset the bipolar balance of power that had been the determinant factor of the post-World 
War II international political order. After having dominated the East-West relations since 
the end of the World War II, arms race and politico-ideological competition diminished 
as the struggle between communism and capitalism came to an end.
The end of the Cold War, followed by the demise of the Soviet Union in 
December 1991, fundamentally altered the international system and the dynamics of 
inter-state relations; enhancing western freedom of action and ability to send forces into 
far-flung areas of the world for influence in the sense of making others behave as it 
wishes, and hence causing a shift in the balance of influence in favour of the West; 
ameliorating the position of pro-western countries and undermining the impact of anti­
western states on shaping the pattern and interaction of regional politics. It also
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intensified the conflictual dimensions of inter-ethnic and inter-state relations due to the 
resurfacing of old-historic rivalries that had been suppressed during the Cold War, and at 
the same time eroded cooperative dimensions of relations among regional states due to 
elimination of common Soviet threat that had cemented them during bipolar system of 
international politics. (Hunter. 1999:63-65)
Although emerging international system in the aftermath of the Cold War seemed 
to undermine the international alliances originally designed to counter the expansion of 
Soviets and created serious risks for inter-ethnic civil and inter-state military clashes in 
the heart of Eurasia under the absence of clear mechanisms for preventing them, the 
abandonment of communism along with attempts at démocratisation in former Soviet 
empire ameliorated the potential for cooperation, both regional and global. Rather than 
the interests and restraints related with global concerns that had characterised the old Est- 
West division and bipolar international system during the Cold War, regional concerns 
emerged to play a more important role in determining the content and style of 
international relations. In this complex international environment characterised mainly by 
ideological rapprochement, the globalisation of markets, multi-polarity in decision­
making and resurgence of régionalisation, “the region rather than the nation-state has 
gradually became the focal point of international attention.” (Olcay. 1999:109) Within 
the various sub-systems of the international system such as the Balkans, the Middle East, 
Central Asia and the Caucasus, a struggle for supremacy or influence commenced among 
aspiring regional hegemons. (Aydin, 1996:158) “The passing of the bipolar ear has 
ushered in a transitional acentric world composed of independent, asymmetrically 
equipped nations vying for advantage.” (Rubinstein, 1994)
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In this emerging new order or disorder, “perhaps no other country outside the 
former Soviet bloc has seen its strategic position more radically transformed by the end 
of the Cold War than Turkey”. (Mortimer, 1993:44) The end of the Cold War gave way 
to serious consequences for the character and dynamics of international political system 
and the various regional subsystems, in which Turkey is involved. On the one side, 
Turkey as being a major ally and partner of the West, has benefited from the systemic 
changes triggered by the end of the Cold War, SU’s collapse and resultant Western 
predominance in international system. On the other side, the collapse of the SU has 
relieved Turkish foreign and security policy of certain constraints by opening up new 
areas for Turkish political and economic activities extending from the Balkans to the Far 
East while weakening Turkey’s enemies and rivals such as Iran, Iraq and Syria. For Iran, 
being weakened during eight-year war with Iraq and fall in oil prices, the removal of 
northern military threat is counterbalanced by the dangers arising from regional 
instability and conflicts as well as US’s new containment policy against it. Iran 
perceived a potential threat posed by the formation of independent states of Azerbaijan 
and Turkmenistan which could claim the loyalties of Azeri and Turkmen people 
constituting a considerable part of Iranian population. (Herzig. 1995:3) Likewise, Iraq’s 
military was badly weakened during the Gulf War and UN-imposed sanctions that was to 
be reflected in Turkey’s military operations in northern Iraq against PKK. Similarly, no 
longer receiving modern weaponry from Moscow, military balance in favour of Turkey 
against Syria was to be reflected in Turkey’s self-confidence and assertiveness during 
1998 Ocalan crisis. Nevertheless, though Turkey’s regional power enhanced, the end of 
the cold war and subsequent demise of the SU led to a security vacuum that can be filled
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by a belt of actual or potential instability in Turkey’s vicinity, the Caucasus and Balkans, 
which could drive Turkey in regional conflicts with difficult choices. (Hunter, 1999:65)
The end of the Cold War has dramatically changed Turkey’s strategic 
environment. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and demise of the Soviet Union, on the 
one hand, have rendered the individual Balkan countries more autonomous actors in 
regional and international politics once again, as well as brought about independence for 
Turkic communities of Transcaucasus and Central Asia, which had fallen apart under 
different republics as a result of Soviet drawing of borders in the interwar period. On the 
other hand, these generated an optimism that a long period of peace was to commence in 
this post-Soviet new world. However, extremist nationalism, ethnic conflicts, and 
irredentist tendencies have caused a number of regional wars to erupt and cast a dark 
shadow over the initial optimism. The collapse of the Cold War in Eastern Europe, the 
break-up of the SU into independent states and the subsequent dissolution of the bipolar 
system ha\ e not resulted in the emergence of a more pacific or stable new world order, 
contrary to some earlier projections. (Pamir, 1993:49) Wars in Yugoslavia to ethnic 
conflicts in Caucasus and Central Asia, and the presence of a variety of potential 
instabilities, demonstrated that peace is not to be taken for granted in Turkey’s vicinity. 
Both regional and global actors are required to sustain an interest in cultivating peace if it 
is to be achieved and preserved. This in turn resuscitated Turkey’s interest in achieving a 
broader regional balance and played an important role in compelling Turkey to follow an 
activist policy in search for a stable order.
The end of the Cold War has accentuated the role of geography in a very different 
manner than before as was at the end of the World War II. Turkey came to regard its
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foreign policy “to be very much of a function of the fact that it is geopolitically part of 
the Balkans, the Black Sea Region, the Caucasus and the Middle East and that politically 
it is associated with the West and also with Central Asia” (Kirisci, 1999:252) A variety of 
economic, political, and security issues emerged to focus Turkey’s attention on these 
geographical regions. Turkish foreign policy ceased to be simply an outpost of the West 
and started to take account of the demands of belonging to numerous geographical 
regions. Moreover, as a result of the disintegration of the SU and Yugoslavia, a whole 
new ‘Turkic world’ has opened up, stretching from the Balkans to Central Asia. This 
factor has increased the tendency among Turkish elite to rethink Turkey’s options and 
interests especially with regard to newly independent Turco-Muslim republics of 
Transcauacsus and Central Asia, namely Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
Hence, the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the SU inevitably 
brought about major changes for Turkish foreign and security policy since Turkey could 
not remain unaffected by the drastic changes at international system that had determined 
its foreign policy over the decades. Therefore by 1990, as Ihsan Dagi wrote;
“the rapidly shifting scene of international politics altered the fundamental paradigms of the 
bipolar system and made it impossible for Turkey to follow a traditionalist foreign policy based on 
the relative safety and stability of Cold War politics. In the face of new challenges, a clear-cut 
formulation of foreign policy based on the East-West division had to be replaced by a more 
imaginative one.” (Dagi, 1993:62)
Additionally Turkey, with a high population and GNP growth as well as with a strategic 
and geographical position, came to have a definite military and economic advantage vis- 
à-vis its neighbours.
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2.2. Domestic Changes and Context for Reformulation of Turkish Foreign 
Policy
If changes in the international environment have been so drastic, so have the rapid 
and fundamental developments in Turkey’s own domestic climate. ‘The end of the Cold 
War not only triggered changes outside of Turkey, but also inside the country. Existing 
political taboos were broken and domestic problems which had been suppressed for 
decades, could no longer be shelved.” (Yilmaz, 1994:94) Since 1920s during which 
Atatürk set up new Turkish republic as a secular nation-state on the remnants of the 
Ottoman Empire, 1980s brought more visible and fundamental changes to Turkey than 
anytime. (Fuller, 1992:1)
The potential or actual geopolitical changes in Turkish foreign policy can only be 
understood in the context that the end of the Cold War has brought about a new interplay 
between Turkish domestic political environment and foreign policy issues. In contrast to 
the Cold War period where Turkish foreign policy could be explained as simply a 
function of developments at the international level, in the post-Co Id War era, 
understanding and explaining Turkish foreign policy behaviour increasingly requires the 
need to focus on the domestic sources of foreign policy-making. Since the early 1990s, 
Turkish foreign policy-making has become increasingly more and more complex owing 
to international developments resulting from the end of the Cold War as well as major 
political, economic, social changes in Turkish domestic scene. (Kirisci, 1999:288)
One fundamental change has been the growing démocratisation along with 
economic liberalization inside Turkey that have improved the conditions for public 
participation in the making of foreign policy more than ever before. The governments’ 
pro-western and status quo oriented foreign policies, which were determined mainly by
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the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the military, had been able to find general support 
from other political parties. Foreign policy-making had been largely restricted to a small 
cadre, as the general public showed more interest in domestic politics. Thus, little public 
debate about the main principles of foreign policy ensured consensus on it until 1990s. 
Fuller rightly argued;
“Whereas foreign policy had long been the exclusive preserve of a narrow, highly skilled and 
educated foreign policy elite, Turkey’s evident external economic interests serve to widen the base 
of foreign policy formulation and to interject broader elements of public opinion into the process." 
(Fuller, 1992:4)
Since then, a wide range of actors have been competing to influence this process for
various reasons, ranging from bureaucratic, political, economic, and ideological to ethnic,
cultural and religious ones. This greater popularisation of foreign policy implied that
Turkish foreign policy which had been characterized with sobriety and caution for so
long, would be increasingly determined by other domestic concerns including;
“economic and commercial goals that the business community might urge upon Turkish foreign 
policy, Islamic groups that introduce an ‘Islamic factor’ into Turkish foreign policy, 
nationalist/neo-panTurkist impulses that increase Turkish interest in the Turkic world to the East, 
and a potential emotional resentment toward western Europe that denies Turkey’s entry to the EC 
and otherwise offends the Turkish sense of dignity in passing judgment on Turkey’s internal 
politics.” (Fuller, 1 9 9 2 :4 )
The role of various interest groups, especially business associations, ethnically 
and religiously based groups and human rights organisations, in influencing Turkish 
foreign policy-making, has elevated to a level that the government in many instances 
found themselves trapped between their often conflicting demands with respect to several 
issues of foreign policy. With the e.xpression of greater diversity of ideas, the consensus 
on foreign policy issues has been weakened.
Despite the existence of external and structural strategic and economic factors, 
and internal institutional and pohtical paradigms that uphold Turkish foreign policy as
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one emphasizing the commitment to relations with the West and the desire to be part of 
Western schemes of integration, Turkey’s foreign policy agenda and external relations 
have become more multi-dimensional and diverse (Kirisci, 1999:260) not only because of 
the growing interaction and influence of various domestic actors on foreign policy 
decisions, but more importantly due to the Ozal government’s abandonment of statist 
policies of more than sixty years for an open-market economy. Especially in this regard, 
export-oriented industrialisation and trade policies brought about extraordinary growth to 
Turkish economy (7'*’ among OECD countries during 1990s overall), and gave way to an 
unprecedented international perspective for overall economic actors that had direct 
influence on Turkish foreign policy through increasing the economic interests initially in 
the Middle East, but then in the Balkans, the Black sea region and the Turkic Republics 
of the former SU. (Fuller, 1992:3) With Turkish interests becoming more ‘global’, the 
questions of direct concern for Turkey emerged to stretch from Western Europe to 
western China, quite apart from the obsession with traditional challenges stemming from 
troubled relations on Turkey’s borders. (Lesser, 1999:80)
Relative increase in Turkey’s regional strength and power was accompanied by a 
widening of public interest in foreign policy problems in accordance with growing 
democratization inside the country. As the domestic debate on foreign and security policy 
has become more vigorous and diverse, Ataturkist tradition came under reexamination. 
(Pope, 1991) “With a lessening of some Ataturkist values-statism, isolationism, elitist 
paternalism, avoidance of Islamic and pan-Turkic ideological interests- such factors as 
nationalist, pan-Turkist and Islamic ideologies have greater room for influence.” (Fuller, 
1992:4) In this regard, public opinion and media came to play an important role in
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sharpening the long-standing questions concerning Turkey’s national and geopolitical 
identity, its classical principles of secularism and statism in state-society relations, and 
traditional hallmarks of Western-orientation, non-intervention, caution and sobriety in 
international and regional politics.
As a part of the overall liberalization of political and economic system, by the 
beginning of 1990s a more pluralist conception of Turkish national identity had begun to 
replace the previous one characterised as monolithic, rigid and limited. Until then, public 
recognition of ethnic diversity would have been considered taboo. A new model of 
nationalism was urged to be one based on the recognition of country’s cultural diversity 
and richness rather than uniformity as well as on the acceptance of principles of cultural 
pluralism, human rights and market economy. (Nokta, 1993:20) Ciller, for example, 
stated that “I see the ethnic and religious richness of Turkey as being like the variations 
and colouration of a mosaic.” (Hürriyet, 1993) This shift towards a more liberal and 
pluralist vision of national identity, in return, sharpened Turkish policy-makers’ focus on 
“wider global concerns rather than a traditional and narrowly-defined conception of 
national self-interest” so that “Turkish foreign policy would become both more activist 
and less parochial.” (W.Hale, 1993:237) This has been no more evident in Turkey’s 
involvement with the newly independent five Turkic Republics.
2.3. Turkey’s Response to post-Cold War Politics: Period of Relief and
Anxiety (1987-1990)
The end of East-West polarization was greeted with mixed feelings by Turkish 
leaders: while the century-old Soviet, Russian threat to Turkish security seemed to 
disappear, a frequent conclusion in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War was that
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Turkey had lost both its previous role as a “western ally holding back the spread of
hostile influence and ideology” (Zviagelskaya, 1994:135), and the international influence
it had exercised before in accordance with its strategic role in the anti-Soviet alliance.
(Sayari, 1992:10-11) Since the previous strategic calculations that gave Turkey
prominence were no longer valid, the status quo oriented policy-makers were straining to
adopt Turkey into the new post-Cold War environment (Barker. 1995:148).
With the end of the Cold War, the collapse of Soviet power removed the main
threat to Turkey’s security. (Ecevit, 1989) The threat of Russian-Soviet expansionism
throughout the 19“’ and 20“’ centuries had determined Turkey’s geopolitical strategy.
Having been subject to the omnipresence of Russian military power and expansionist
ambitions for about two centuries, the collapse of the Soviet power relieved Turkey both
from the military presence of a superpower as its neighbour and from the ideological
challenges of communism. Thus, the end of the Cold War partly came as a great relief to
Turkey, as Russian military withdrew from the boundaries of Turkey, thereby reducing
an imminent security threat to Turkey. Soviet collapse, eliminating the common border
separating the Russian-Soviet Empire from its long-term antagonist Turkey, established a
huge buffer zone along the southern frontier between the Russian Federation and Turkey.
As the possibility of a confrontation between the East and the West no longer
existed, old hostilities motivated by ideological and military competition became
replaced by new friendships and former socialist countries in Eastern Europe adopted
multi-party systems and free market economies to reform their old systems. These
fundamental changes meant according to Onis;
“the downgrading of the geostrategic importance that Turkey had enjoyed during the Cold War as 
an integral component of NATO alliance, w-ith a corresponding decline in the likelihood of its
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becoming a full member of the EU. The immediate implications seemed to be increased isolation 
and insecurity...” (Onis, 1995:49)
The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and consecutive disappearance of ‘common 
foe’ for the West with the end of the Cold War threatened to condemn Turkey to 
insignificance on the periphery of the ‘European House’ (Yilmaz, 1994:93) as it reduced 
the need for such a defensive bastion as NATO alliance, within which Turkey had served 
as the southern bulwark against the Soviet expansionism. (Mango, 1994:110) Initially, it 
was not easy for Turkey to witness the breakdown of Soviet economic and political 
system throughout Eastern Europe and the SU's exit from the international scene. 
Turkish decision-makers hardly welcomed the end of the cold War and resultant victory 
of western democracies. The Turkish leadership's anxiety stemmed from the concern that 
warming of East-West relations would no: only diminish the country’s strategic 
importance to its Western allies but also would translate into less military and economic 
assistance and harsher Western attitude towards human right issues in Turkey.
Turkish leaders feared that their countn. would become less important for western 
allies in terms of geopolitics and military strategy as Turkey suddenly found itself in a 
‘security limbo.’ After having based its whole foreign and security policies during the 
Cold War period on the strategic importance and value of its location for the West against 
the Soviet threat, Turkey faced that military and economic assistance derived from the 
Western allies and the continuity of Western security umbrella became problematic as the 
relevance and function of NATO; hence the ‘raison detre’ of Turkey’s contribution to the 
West in the post-Cold War era was opened into question. (Dagi, 1993:61) Duygu Sezer 
has noted that “the network of relations that Turkey built with Western Europe at the
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height of the Cold War seems to have entered a state of paralysis, if not dissolution...” 
(Sezer, 1992:22)
Turkey has not emerged from the Cold War with a sense of enhanced security 
unlike many other members of anti-Soviet alliance, as the emergence of democracies in 
Eastern Europe established a buffer zone between Western Europe and the Soviet Union 
or Russia. But, Turkey still felt threatened by uncertainties and instabilities regarding its 
immediate neighbourhood and faced at the same time the possibility of being abandoned 
by its Western allies. This has shaken the foundations of Turkish security policy and 
increased the need to reassess its position vis-a-vis potential threats in this post-Cold War 
era. (Brown, 1991:4) It has been argued that after the end of the Cold War. the major 
threat to Turkey has come from the southeast, namely from Syria and Iraq, (Kuniholm, 
1991:36-37) Besides being surrounded by a host of potential adversaries from outside, 
Turkey at the same time faced an active insurgency intended on dismantling the Turkish 
state from inside. Moreover, as the distinctions between ethnicity and nationality began to 
disappear overall internationally, the collapse of the SU and Yugoslavia was regarded as 
a precedent for the break-up of other multi-ethnic states, and hence as a frightening 
example for Turkey in view of its own Kurdish citizens. Kirisci described Turkey’s 
position in an excellent way;
"Hence the cosy niche that the Cold War environment had created for Turkey become replaced 
with one of uncertainty in respect to Turkish security. During this period (at the end of the Cold 
War), it seemed to many Turkish decision-makers that Turkey was being left out in the ‘cold’ to 
fend for itself.” (Kirisci, 1995:1)
Similarly, Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin stated that
"because its geopolitical and geostrategic location places Turkey in the neighbourhood of the most 
unstable, uncertain and unpredictable region of the world, it has turned into a frontline-state, faced 
with multiple fronts. It is all times possible for crisis and conflicts in these regions to spread and 
engulf Turkey.” (Sezer, 1 9 9 4 :2 5 )
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While Turkey was increasingly uneasy about its position, Republican Senator Robert 
Dole in turn argued that the US should decrease its aid and assistance to a group of 
countries, including Turkey, since the end of the Cold War had diminished their 
importance for the US. (Sezer. 1992:25)
Although the Soviet threat evaporated, the departure of Soviet power created a 
vacuum near the Turkish borders and the e.xistence of substantial risks along NATO’s 
southern tier ensured that Turkey would become the alliance’s new front-line state 
(Johnsen, 1992) in the midst of potential risks and threats for regional security emanating 
from deep tensions among mixed nationalities, contested artificial borders, economic 
hardships and competition of outside powers for influence. Turkey’s rising importance as 
‘point man’ on NATO’s southern flank coincided with European reluctance to 
comprehend the risks facing Turkey which, resulted in a predicament for Turkey. While 
it strongly wanted NATO to safeguard Turkish security against the instability that occurs 
along its borders, Turkey began to hesitate in supporting NATO actions in controversies 
that it would prefer avoiding otherwise, like in the case of Operation Provide Comfort 
during the Gulf Crisis. (Johnsen, 1993)
The dramatic changes in Eastern Europe that suddenly left Turkey face to face 
with a new political and security environment in world politics, coincided also with EC's 
rejection of Turkey’s application for full membership. While the Berlin wall coming 
down and the Cold War beginning was waning, Turkey’s application that had been made 
in 1987 was turned down by European Commission’s decision in December 1989 on the 
grounds that fundamental economic and political problems needed solution before
32
Turkey’s admission. This reinforced Turkish concerns that besides being turned down by 
Europe, it was also losing its strategic importance for the West even further.
The end of the East-West division in Europe widened the political and economic 
options for European Community in enlarging itself and hence deprived Turkey of its 
most powerful argument in favour of EC membership, that full economic and political 
integration would enhance Turkey’s contribution to the defense of the West. Moreover, 
the growth of global discourse in the West about democracy and human rights paved the 
way for more Western interference in démocratisation and human rights issues inside 
Turkey. Winrow wrote;
“Since Turkey is no longer perceived as so important to Western security interests now that the 
tangible Soviet threat had disappeared, the US and Western Europe have become increasingly 
critical of Turkish policy towards its Kurdish people, and the cases of human rights violations.” 
(Winrow, 1995:2)
The end of the Cold War has fundamentally altered the axis around which 
Turkey’s importance for the West is debated. Not only Turkey’s attitude towards Russia 
now but also towards several issues, from the Balkans and the Aegean to the Middle East, 
have become measures as to whether Turkish policy conforms to Western interests. In 
this regard, on the one hand, the collapse of the SU and the Gulf War have meant that 
Europe no longer defines Turkey as a vital country as its southern flank but rather as an 
important buffer in the Middle East. On the other hand, the end of the Cold War and the 
progressive integration of Central and Eastern Europe with Euro-Atlantic institutions has 
encouraged a redefinition of European space in terms of geopolitics and culture so as to 
reinforce existing perceptions of Turkish ‘otherness.’ (Lesser, 1999:81-82) Moreover, the 
appearance of ethnic, historical, and religious conflicts in Turkey’s vicinity to replace the 
ideological East-West struggle presented Turkey in the view of Europe as a non-
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European and non-Christian state. For many Europeans, the Muslim world including 
Turkey, which had been Europe’s ‘relevant other’ for centuries, emerged once again as 
Europe’s ‘relevant other’ counterpart (Neumann&Welsh, 1991) while Turkey once again 
felt marginalized in Europe. In turn, European ambivalence about the integration of 
Turkey due to economic, political and cultural reasons and EC’s inability to offer it a 
promising membership began to undermine Turkey’s assumptions about it place in the 
international system. Hence, Huntington wrote, “the West refuses to accept Turkey as 
such. Turkey will not become a member of the EC, and the real reason, as Ozal said, ‘is 
that we are Muslim and they are Christian’.’’ (Huntington, 1993:42)
2.4. Turkey’s Response to the Emergence of Turkic World
It was painfully observed in Turkey that fundamental paradigms of bipolar 
balance were drastically changed by the dramatic and sudden developments in 
international politics. Turkey has discovered itself in a new unfamiliar world: “facing it, 
Turkey finds itself alone-philosophically, politically and militarily.’’ (Sezer, 1992:31) 
Turkish leaders have been uncomfortable in such an isolated position and have sought 
ways to extricate Turkey from its predicament. Turkey was going through some process 
of reassessing and reformulating its foreign policy philosophy as it recognised the 
impossibility of pursuing a traditional foreign policy based on the relative safety and 
stability of the Cold War era. In this regard, Turkey’s policy approach towards the newly 
independent Turkic Republics of the former Soviet Union reflected a gradual but a 
fundamental shift in its foreign policy orientation resulting both from previously 
mentioned domestic changes and the international developments at the end of the Cold
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War. The extent of this shift cannot be understood in any way without comparing 
Turkey’s overtures towards the republics after their declarations of independence (and 
subsequent Turkish recognition of them), with its response to the popular movements of 
Soviet Muslims during 1989-1990 period. (Aydin, 1996:160)
2.4.1 Period of Initial Caution (1989-1991)
Even before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the process of glasnost (openness) 
and perestroika (restructuring) during Gorbachev’s leadership in the USSR had 
eliminated most of the barriers to interaction and communication between various 
peoples of the SU and their linguistic, ethnic and religious kin in neighbouring areas. 
Fuller wrote;
“If Iron Curtain succeeded in closing off Eastern Europe from the rest of the world for four 
decades of Soviet rule, the ramparts that blocked off Soviet Central Asia for as long as seven 
decades were much more impenetrable.... Like the Berlin Wall, those Central Asian ramparts are 
coming down, affording unique glimpses into the long-isolated and e.xotic Muslim peripheries of 
the Soviet empire.” (Fuller, 1990:49)
This enhanced interaction and communication raised new questions concerning the issues 
such as cultural and ethnic identities and the direction of external relations for the 
republics as well as neighbouring areas, including Turkey. (Hunter, 1999:66-67)
One the hand, liberalizing policies of glasnost and perestroika enabled various 
republics to express their nationalist views and discontent. (Sowerwine, 1995:28) On the 
other hand, given the considerable number of Turkic peoples in the SU and historical 
links between them and Turkish people, these new developments triggered a debate in 
Turkey regarding its identity and the need to reassess some of the basic foundations of its 
foreign and security policy.
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When confronted with the opportunity to establish relations with the individual 
Soviet republics after Gorbachev’s ‘glasnost’ and ‘perestroika’ policies began to open the 
previously closed Soviet system, Turkey’s basic policy was still formulated to avoid 
giving any perception of seeking to undermine the existing USSR. (Simsir, 1992:14-15; 
Bilge, 1995:84-87) Although the relaxation of internal politics in the SU had created 
opportunities for Turkey to expand ties with the Turkic-speaking populations of the 
USSR, despite the active involvement of several Turkish political, economic and cultural 
groups in various republics, Turkish government remained cautious in its approach 
during the Soviet Muslims’ popular movements of late 1980s, because of the strength of 
the traditional prudence of Turkish foreign policy at that time, along with the recognition 
that the SU remained intact and the status of the republics was far from clear. Unlike the 
majority of the country’s population, Turkish government did not interest itself much 
initially in the fate of Azeris and Central Asians, lest it be accused of expansionist aims 
and seeking to promote pan-Turkist ideas.
Besides the traditional concern not to be seen interfering in the internal affairs of 
the SU, the increasing importance of economic ties and Turkey’s support for 
Gorbachev’s domestic reforms accounted for the restraint of the Turkish government. 
Even before Gorbachev gained power, Turkey’s relations with the SU had begun to 
improve with the rapid growth of their bilateral trade and conclusion of the Natural Gas 
Agreement in September 1984. Signing of a Treaty of Friendship and Good 
Neighbourliness in Moscow in March 1991 between President Ozal and Gorbachev, both 
sides pledged to increase their trade turnover to $10 billion by 2000, and demonstrated 
the great existing potential for economic cooperation between the two countries.
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Moreover, an understanding with the SU’s leadership not to exploit the secession process 
in an anti-Soviet/Russian direction would ease Moscow’s decision to permit it. (Fuller, 
1990:61)
Even president Ozal who would eventually become the champion of Turkey’s 
collaboration with Central Asia was too cautious. When asked about Turkey’s view of 
events, which occurred during 1989 crisis in Soviet Azerbaijan after which Soviet troops 
were introduced into Baku in January 1990 to repress brutally the activities of 
Azerbaijani Popular Front, Ozal said it was more of a concern to Iran than Turkey 
because Azerbaijanis are Shi’ites (Karpat, 1992-4:105), Turkey was solely concerned 
with its own internal problems, and that Azerbaijani crisis was an internal affair of the 
SU. He further stated that Turkey did not nurture aspirations of a Turkish empire 
encompassing the Turkic republics of the SU, but rather would continue to pursue 
Ataturk’s policy of non-involvement in foreign conflicts along with the principle of 
‘peace at home, peace in the world.’ (Cumhuriyet, 1990)
By respecting the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of the SU until 
the SU’s very demise, Turkey never adopted an opportunistic policy towards the 
disintegration process of the SU Bilal Simsir, then-Head of Turkic Department in Turkish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote;
“Turkey evaluated every impulse of the former SU and pursued a careful and balanced policy 
...One the one hand continuing good relations with the Moscow government, on the other hand 
developing relations with each ex-Soviet republics, Turkey achieved a responsible, confidence- 
building and sober policy without hastening the disintegration process or shaking the confidence 
of the SU. When the time came to establish and develop relations with each ex-Soviet republic, 
Turkey did not hesitate to act.” (SimsİT, 1992:12)
As Turkish public opinion rediscovered the Turkic world, the first steps for the 
establishment of relations with the Turkic Republics were taken by private companies.
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associations and foundations. Despite the ongoing official caution, with then president of 
Soviet Azerbaijan Ayaz Muttalibov’s visit to Ankara on January 5-10 1990, in which two 
agreements on economic and cultural cooperation were signed and also with the 
subsequent Baku affair, Turkish leadership began to feel the need to develop proper 
policies towards Azerbaijan and other Turkic Republics in accordance with the new 
conditions there. (Kut, 1996:378)
As a part of Gorbachev’s reforms, individual Soviet republics attained some 
freedom to conduct their foreign policy. In the process of the 1990 disintegration of the 
SU in line with other union republics, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Kazakhstan respectively declared their sovereignty on June 20, August 22, 
September 23, October 12 and October 25. (Simsir, 1992:12) After proclaiming their 
sovereignty, mutual official visits were commenced between Turkey and the Republics, 
and various agreements were signed. During this period, twenty-one high level visits 
were made and twenty agreements were signed between Turkey and Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan. (Simsir, 1992:12) During his visit to 
the SU in March 1991, Ozal and his large entourage travelled also to Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan. Ozal’s visit in turn led to the arrival of higher-ranking Soviet Central Asian 
delegations in Turkey, an example being the May 1991 visit by the prime minister of 
Kyrgyzstan. Thus, as the disintegration of the SU accelerated in the latter half of 1991, 
the Turks focused their attention more and more Turkic components of the USSR. But, 
Turkish government took extreme care not to seem the working around Moscow but 
rather appealed for understanding about popular pressure in Turkey urging direct ties 
with them.
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The term ‘sovereignty’ in Soviet usage was not synonymous with ‘independence.’ 
Declarations of sovereignty had been made by all the Central Asian republics in 1990. 
but as with similar declarations made by other Soviet republics, the intentions at that time 
was certainly not to leave the Union; rather the declarations signalled a desire for greater 
autonomy in running their own internal affairs. The turning point in the break-up of the 
Soviet Union was the failure of the coup attempt by hard-liners against Gorbachev in 
August 1991. Even Soviet Central Asian leadership, who had not wanted to take part in 
the disintegration process, came to realize that the days of the Soviet Union were 
numbered, but still followed the example of other republics to declare their independence. 
In 1991, Azerbaijan on August 30, Kyrgyzstan on August 31, Uzbekistan on September 
1, Turkmenistan on October 27and Kazakhstan on December 16 declared their 
independence. (Kut, 1996:378) Suat Bilge wrote:
“It is the Russian Federation which put an end to the Soviet Union...Yeltsin did was to recognise 
the Baltic Republics that have declared independence. This policy has changed in time. The states 
that declared independence were pressurized with force and ruble... (Muslim Turkic republics) 
They did not want to leave the Soviet Union but they were in a sense pushed aside ... In this 
situation they first turned their hopes to Turkey. Turkey was also pushed aside by the EU and into 
a state of loneliness.” (Bilge, 1995,96)
Having declared their independence and just beginning to celebrate their long- 
suppressed Islamic and Turkic roots, the Republics demanded immediate recognition 
from Turkey as the latter remained “the only free and independent Turkish state, a 
cultural centre and historic magnet to much of the Soviet Turkic population.’’ (Fuller, 
1990:51) However, due to Russian Federation’s contradictory tendencies, Turkey faced a 
difficulty in the recognition of Muslim Turkic Republics. Although two official Turkish 
fact-finding commissions that were sent to Transcaucasus and Central Asia in order to 
evaluate the conditions there reported the potential for cooperation along several
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dimensions, they did not recommended that Turkey recognise the independence 
declarations of the republics. Turkey’s shifting outlook on the Turkic republics and its 
desire to develop relations with them were clearly highlighted by Ankara's decision to 
become the first state to recognise the independence of Azerbaijan on November 9, 1991 
after some hesitation. While being anxious about the existing SU’s reaction to this, 
Turkey’s recognition of Azerbaijan underlined the emerging competition between Turkey 
and Iran for regional influence, and reaffirmed the special relationship between the Turks 
and the Azeris. Nevertheless, remaining four Central Asian Turkic Republics still had to 
wait for a positive response from Turkey. For instance, at the beginning of December 
1991, Turkish leadership turned down the request of visiting President Saparmurad 
Niyazov to recognise the independence of Turkmenistan. Thus, Ankara reacted 
cautiously to the initial declarations of independence of the republics calculating that 
such status could not necessarily mean their breakaway from the Union.
Nevertheless the most critical turning point came with the formation of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States on December 8, 1991, when the presidents of 
Belarus, Ukraine and Russia, meeting in Minsk, agreed on the replacement of Soviet 
system of inter-republican relations with a new one based on the principles of 
independence and equality. On December 11, 1991 the Soviet Central Asian Republics’ 
decision to join the CIS after meeting in Ashgabat, marked the final dissolution of the 
USSR. Before official acknowledgment of this on December 25, 1991, Turkey 
announced on December 16, 1991 that it was ready to establish diplomatic relations with 
all of the independent republics, including Turkic Republics, in order to avoid conveying
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the impression of being only interested in developing ties with the latter. (Winrow, 
1995:12)
While the establishment of the CIS on December 8, 1991, in the first meeting of 
the Slavic Republics in Minsk, marked the end of the USSR, the second meeting of the 
enlarged CIS in Alma Ata on December 21,1991 declared the former Soviet republics as 
sovereign and independent. Five of these 21 republics, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are regarded as Turkic Republics. In each, the 
majority of the population is Muslim and Turkic in origin.
2.4.2 Period of Early Euphoria and Factors Behind It (1992-3)
The disintegration of the SU was an unprecedented historical event in that no 
other empire in the history had collapsed and disappeared so quickly without a foreign 
and civil war. The emergence of former Soviet republics in the Transcaucasus and 
Central Asia as the independent nation-states has drastically shifted the geopolitics of 
Eurasia and the Middle East almost overnight. Despite common ties to the people of the 
area, Turkey had no relations with central Asian Republics until the end of the Cold War. 
Since Turkish officials had showed little interest in the fate of Turkic peoples in Soviet 
Central Asia until the final months before the disintegration of the SU, Turkish 
government was much more surprised when the SU rapidly unravelled to impinge 
independence on the Turkic Republics.
This unforseen disintegration of the SU and the sudden emergence of independent 
Turkic states at the end of 1991, gave rise to an initial euphoria in Turkey at the prospects 
of reestablishing relations with the long-separated Turkic cousins. Since the initial
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confusion over the level and nature of new relationships was resolved with the formal 
dissolution of the SU and the establishment of independent Turkic Republics in 
December 1991, Turkey’s official attitude towards Soviet Central Asia and 
Transcaucasus changed in a sudden and dramatic way. Stimulated by Turkish public 
opinion and the press fascinated with Turkey’s long-lost brothers in the former SU, 
Turkish officials were eager to cultivate close relations with their once forgotten and new 
rediscovered Turkic cousins (Winrow, 1995:274) so that Turkey totally abandoned its 
pro-Moscow stance and initiated a program of active and intense relations with Turkic 
states. Hence as the SU disintegrated and the republics started peeking out from behind 
the proverbial Iron Curtain, Turkey’s relations with the independent Turkic states of the 
region developed initially in an apparent state of euphoria along with the discovery of 
linguistic, ethnic and religious kinship with the Turkic people. (Gokay&Longhorne, 
1996:2)
Turkey’s position in the post-Cold War era determined Turkey’s reaction to the 
emergence of the Turkic republics. Turkey was increasingly uneasy about its post-Cold 
War posture regarding its foreign and security policies and was searching for its own 
place in this new world order. Because its sense of insecurity has been not only 
heightened by the conflicts around its borders- in the Balkans, the Transcaucasus, and 
northern Iraq-as well as by the strife in southeastern Turkey itself, but has been 
reinforced also by its rebuff from the EC along with the questioning of NATO’s 
importance and Turkey’s place and role within the alliance, the emergence of Turkic 
states beyond its northern border in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia has clearly
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presented Turkish leadership with a welcome opportunity for enhancing its geopolitical 
influence and role. (Pamir, 1993:50; Warikoo, 1995)
Mainly Turkey’s cool relations with Europe, indicated in EC’s rebuff to Turkey’s 
application for membership in 1989 and Turkey’s isolation in such matters as Cyprus and 
Kurdish separatism, and Turkish attempts to reassert Turkey's strategic value for the 
West in order to restore its prospects for joining the EU, played important role in the 
enthusiastic Turkish reaction to the emancipation of the Turkic Republics. Turkish 
leadership needed to have some new arguments by which they could approach the 
Western powers to convince them that Turkey occupies an important strategic position 
and role in international system. Indeed, at the expense of losing millions of dollars from 
the closure of Iraqi pipeline to Yumurtalik and erosion of its sovereignty due both to 
allowing the use of air bases and opening and escalation of Kurdish problem, Turkey’s 
active support of the Western coalition against Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War, as a 
major departure from the traditional Turkish foreign policy of non-involvement in Middle 
Eastern inter-Arab conflicts, was an attempt to persuade the West that Turkey was still 
important for the realization of Western interests and to gain admission for full 
membership in the EU. However, non-realization of these expectations in turn reinforced 
the belief in Turkey that it is without support and lonely in international relations. So, in 
1991 Turkey needed allies, and in this respect the emergence of Turkic Republics was 
very important development. Because of their common culture, ethnicity and history, 
Turkey regarded the republics as natural allies and hoped to get support for its position on 
regional and international issues. (Bal, 1998:65,68) “Turks suddenly believed that they 
were not alone in the world but that there were after all other ‘Turks’ living in the former
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Soviet Union. It was hoped that in embracing these other Turks, Turkey’s stature in the 
world order would be elevated accordingly.” (Winrow, 1995:12)
As a result of the demise of the SU, Turkey encountered with a Turkic world in 
Transcaucasus and Central Asia in which it desired to exert influence and from which it 
was faced with certain demands. (Kramer, 1996:113) For the majority of Turkish public 
and elite, it was very welcome development to rediscover the old cousins in what is 
considered to be the original Turkish homeland and civilization. As put by Milliyet 
(1991), “it has been a great thrill for Turkey to realize that they are no longer alone in the 
world.” Since, besides Turkey, now there are other independent and sovereign states 
where the peoples from Turkic ethnic origin as the dominant group speak a language and 
follow a popular culture that has much in common with that of Anatolian Turks, as 
Kramer wrote;
"Turkey’s relative isolation between, on the one side, Europe (to which Turkey and her people 
strongly want to belong but often have been rejected; and, on the other side, the Arab world (of 
which the Turks never really saw themselves as integral part and which itself displayed an attitude 
of strong reserve towards Turkey) all of a sudden seemed to have come to an end." (Kramer, 
1996:112)
Accordingly, Ziya Onis advocated that;
"The dramatic significance of the emergence of the Turkic Republics is that they have helped 
Turkey to overcome its cultural isolation-an isolation that stems from being neither Arab nor fully 
European. Turkey, at least, has been able to find a new group of countries to which it can relate 
both culturally and economically.” (Onis, 1995:60)
Although academics were discussing a possible collapse and break-up of the 
USSR in the early 1980s, (Rupert, 1992:177) the rapid unravelling of the SU had not 
been expected by the leadership in Turkey and the then-Soviet Central Republics. 
Because of the Cold War and fear of Soviet expansionism, Turkish decision-makers had 
refrained from dealing with other Turkic people known as ‘outer Turks‘ (Dis Turkler) in
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order to avoid provoking the SU by inspiring the allegations of pan-Turkism on their part 
which was regarded by Turkish leadership as dangerous to regional peace and stability. 
Thus, Turkey was so unprepared for the emancipation of Turkic Republics from the yoke 
of Moscow as independent states (Mütercimler, 1993:12) that even Turkish president 
Demirel admitted Turkey’s unreadiness by saying;
“While the 1990s approached, no one could have imagined that the SU would disintegrate, and 
that out of it a Georgia, an Azerbaijan, a Turkmenistan, an Uzbekistan, a Tajikistan and an 
Armenia would become independent....the disintegration of the Soviet union was a surprise for 
everybody. No one was prepared for an event of this kind. Including the Republics which emerged 
out...” (B a l, 1 9 9 8 :5 8 -5 9 )
As Fuller pointed out, “Turkey has long been steeped in its own Ataturkist legacy, 
pointedly eschewing any interest in pan-Turkism” and then-Soviet Republics, because it 
was considered as “distracting, unrealistic, and dangerous given the character of Soviet 
power.” (Fuller, 1990:64) Accordingly, Turkish policy-makers and analysts had not had 
much information about the USSR and hence they were not able to apprehend the 
possibility of a sudden disintegration of the SU, unlike Atatürk, who had quoted the 
following:
“Today the SU is our friend, our neighbour, our ally. We need this friendship. But no one can 
foretell what will happen tomorrow. Just like the Ottoman Empire, just like Austria-Hungary, it 
could fall apart or crumble. The peoples it is today holding firmly in its grasp could escape. The 
world may reach a balance. In that case, Turkey must know what to do. Under the administration 
of this friend there live brethren who share our language, our faith. We must be ready to claim 
them...W e cannot wait for them (the Turks abroad) to reach out to us. We must reach out to 
them.” (Muftu, 1998:33)
However, Turkey was eager to get involved in the Turkic Republics once the SU 
disintegrated, but the sudden rediscovery of almost forgotten peoples of Turkic origin led 
to inflated hopes and unrealistic expectations on the part of Turkish officialdom and 
public. (Winrow, 1995:3) Ayvaz Gokdemir, a Turkish deputy and then-state minister 
wrote rightly that ‘This fact (independence of Turkic Republics) which were never
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expected or hoped for, never prepared for, and faced suddenly, inspired our sprits to 
make great efforts.” (Gokdemir. 1995:48-50)
As the collapse of communism has brought about the emergence of neo­
nationalist movements in the newly liberated and independents states, with the support of 
spread of démocratisation, human rights values, and the growth of Kurdish separatism, a 
new sense of Turkish nationalism appeared to emerge upon a different basis from the 
narrowly defined focus on the Turks within the boundaries of Turkish state. The belief in 
Turkish public opinion that the West was employing a double standard with regard to 
“the discrepancy between Western quest to promote human rights in Turkey, its interest 
in the Kurdish problem, and yet its inaction to stop the killing of Muslims in Bosnia,” led 
to transforming effect on the self-identity of Turkish masses. (Dagi, 1993:73) In this 
context, the reemergence of Turkic communities from Adriatic to the Great Wall of 
China and Siberia led to growing awareness of the diversity and richness of Turkish 
community along with its history.
A broader examination of the Ottoman past and the reemergence of conflicts in 
former Ottoman territories in Caucasus and the Balkans gave rise to the emergence of 
neo-Ottomanist school of thought among some Turkish intellectuals, as way of coming to 
terms with the presence of Kurds in Turkey, Turks/Muslims in the Balkans as well as 
Turkic peoples in the East. (Candar, 1992; Calik, 1992) This modern version of 
Ottomanism challenged the prudent and non-interventionist dimensions of traditional 
foreign policy, and questioned the Turkish national identity by emphasizing the cultural 
roots and commonalities of Turkish-Turkic people. Neo-Ottomanists recommended that 
Turkey should develop an ‘imperial vision’ based on the “free movement of people, ideas
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and goods in the lands of the old Ottoman Empire.” (Cohen, 1992) Cengiz Candar, a 
famous journalist, argued that Turkey’s new geopolitical realities can no longer be 
addressed by “an ideology the relevance of which is limited to the period between 1923 
and 1990; which is grounded in the concept of ‘peace at home and peace in the world’.” 
(Bayar, 1992:31) Fatih Çekirge, another journalist, even go further by stating that “It is 
up to a generation such as ours ...to replace status-quo with a search for new horizons.” 
(Bayar, 1992:33)
Accordingly, pan-Turkist ideas also revived. Aydin Yalcin argued that pan-
Turkism was an idea whose time had arrived and advocated that the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the discrediting of communism, “had finally given a public expression
and support to pan-Turkism.” (Cohen, 1992) Also, Bilal Simsir, the head of Turkic
Department at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that;
Turkey’s efforts to cultivate ties with the Turkic Republics could give rise to the emergence “of 
something similar to the Nordic Council, the Arab League, or the organisation of American 
states...What is more natural than Turkey taking the lead in creating such a grouping?...This is 
not pan-Turkism in the wrong meaning, it is not expansionism...The Nordics, the Arabs, the 
Latins and others have such groups, ^^ 'hy should not Turkish people?" (Cohen, 1992)
Thus, in this new version of pan-Turkism, the aim was creating a loose political and
economic Turkic grouping within which Turkey would play a leadership role in
economic and cultural terms rather than a close political union.
All of these trends and attitudes reflected both search for a redefinition of Turkish
national identity and the emergence of a new kind of Turkish nationalism to embrace
enthusiastically the feelings of commonalities and the need to forge close relations with
Turkic Republics in a euphoric way. As Ihsan Dagi stated;
“Whereas in the past, any mention of ‘outside Turks’ was enough to be branded as a racist and 
fascist, it now seems that all segments of Turkish society feel a particular interest and solidarity 
with these peoples... The cultural map of the Turkish nation...has been broadened to include the
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entire region from the Balkans to China. Talk of Turkish-speaking community of states, stretching 
from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China has become common. This growing confidence and 
optimism led Ozal to claim twenty-first century would be the ‘Turkish century.” (Dagi,
1993:73)
Furthermore, the low level of economic and political development of the Turkic 
peoples generated a general impression of superiority among Turkish people and 
provided an opportunity for their country to become a role model and the leader of the 
Turkic Republics. Turkey could hardly expect to experience such hopes in its relations 
with the west. Exaggerated claims in international press that Turkey was becoming a 
great state and that there was an area open to Turkish influence from the Balkans to 
western China also affected the sentiments of Turkish people by boosting Turkish ego. 
Thus, these psychological preconditions established a context proving important in the 
formation of “high expectations and unrealistic imaginings” of the Turkish public 
opinion and leadership with regard to the “importance, dimension and scope” of Turkey’s 
relations with the Turkic Republics of Caucasus and Central Asia. (Ogutcu, 1994,105)
Western officials and media as well as the leadership of Turkic Republics played 
their important part in whipping up Turkish enthusiasm and encouraging the initial 
feeling of euphoria in Turkey. Turkish expectations were so great because they were 
aroused with the rationalist expectations of the West and the republics. Thus, as the 
break-up of the SU led to a power vacuum in the Balkans to the west of Turkey, and in 
the Caucasus to the east, Turkey stood to gain in vacuum left by Moscow in the Turkic 
Republics, and many officials in Ankara had high hopes of establishing Turkey as the 
leading actor in post-soviet Central Asia and the Transcaucasus.
Western governments advocated that Turkey become actively involved out of 
the fear that Iranian-inspired religious radicalism would spread into politically unstable
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and nuclear Central Asia, and promoted Turkish model for the newly independent 
Turkic/Muslim states as an alternative to an Iranian religious fundamentalist model. With 
the dismemberment of the ex-Soviet Union, when they faced the dilemma of decline of 
the communism and rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the region, many observers in the 
West have begun to think about Turkism. For the West, such at trend seemed to be 
dangerous because it meant the replacement of a rival ideology with an even more anti- 
Western one. In order to contain the development such a trend, especially experts of 
Turkey in the US have suggested that Turkey could be a model country for the Turkic 
Republics of Central Asia. (Christian Science Monitor, 1992; Financial Times, 1992; 
Fuller&Lesser, 1993) Robins pointed out that:
“when the Soviet Union formally broke up, exaggerated claims were immediately made as to the 
role that Turkey could play in Central Asia. Such claims owed more to ideology than to 
practicality. The major proponent of such a view was the US which feared that a political vacuum 
had been created in Central Asia and that it would be filled by Iran and its revolutionary brand of 
Islam.” (Robins, 1994:63)
As Turkey represented secularism, democracy and closeness to the West, the 
West promoted Turkish model as an ideal path for the new republics. US president 
George Bush, during a meeting with Turkish PM Demirel in the latter’s visit to 
Washington on 13 February 1992, pointed to Turkey as “the model of democratic, secular 
state, which could be emulated by Central Asia.” (Rashid, 1994:210) In February 1992, 
NATO Secretary General Manfred Woller declared that NATO wants Turkey to support 
the alliance’s interests in Central Asia by countering the danger of fundamentalism 
spreading there. (Rashid, 1994:210) Moreover, during a visit to Central Asia in June 
1992, Catherine Kathumiere, Secretary General of Council of Europe declared that 
“Turkey provided a valid model of development for many independent countries in
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Central Asia.” (Mango, 1993:726) The Times (1992) observed that the “fear of 
fundamentalism spreading in Central Asia has in turn prompted Washington to encourage 
Turkey in its bid for a leading role in the region’s politics.” The Daily Telegraph (1993) 
quoted the US Secretary of State. James Baker, urging Turkmenistan to follow Turkey 
rather than Iran during his visit to Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in February 
1992.
So, by assuming that Russians had vacated the area, and hence a power vacuum 
was created there to be filled by anti-Western and revolutionary ideology of Iran, the 
West initially promoted the Turkish model to Central Asian republics as the best 
alternative to communism and Iranian-inspired political ideology. (Hunter, 1999:71) The 
most active Turkish involvement in Central Asia came after President Bush’s statement 
in February 1992 that the US supported the activities of Turkey as the country best 
positioned culturally and economically to support the development of Central Asian 
republics and keep Iranian fundamentalism fi'om spreading there. The West knew that it 
had a great interest in inculcating into these republics values such as pluralist democracy, 
human rights, economic liberalism and secularism. This made Turkey’s role vital because 
Turkey was regarded as a countr>· that could function as a reference point as well as 
transmission belt for the introduction of these values to the republics. Saban Calis argued 
that:
"as in the case of World War II. in order to defend Western values and interests in Central Asia, 
Turkey since the end of the Cold War, has been asked to use the card of Turkism against Iran and 
Russia. In return, there are some promises that Turkey could strengthen its relations with the 
Western countries.” (Calis, 1997:111)
The idea that Turkey would prevent the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia 
and spread Western values and economic penetration restored Turkey’s perceived value
50
to the West in a dramatic way. (Economist, 1991:2) As Europe, the US, and even 
temporarily Russia agreed to accept Turkey as the model of statehood, economic 
development and democracy for Central Asia and Azerbaijan, Turkish activity in the area 
intensified.
As Turkic leaderships wanted to demonstrate the world that with their own
languages, cultures and traditions they were distinct from Russians who had severely
restricted their relations with the outside world under colonialism and totalitarianism,
they thrilled to receive Turkey’s enthusiastic attention about their own languages and
cultures Also, they were very hopeful about economic aspects of Turkey’s attention.
Moreover, the leaders of the Turkic states, being desperate for international recognition
and support, played their crucial part in instigating Turkey’s feelings of great expectation
and enthusiasm for themselves. For example, during their visits to Ankara in December
1991, both Karimov and Akayev, presidents of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan respectively,
praised Turkey with pleas for support. Karimov stated:
'Uur example is Turkey, we will establish our state according to this example...! support the idea 
of a unified Turkish people, this unification must take place. Instead of political unification, 
economic unification can be established, you can call this a Turkish Common Market. If 
unification is possible for Slavs, it must be possible for Central Asian people and this unification 
must include Azerbaijan and Turkey.” (Cumhuriyet, 1991; Sabah, 1992)
Karimov also declared that he regards Turkey as an elder brother from which Uzbekistan
and other newly independent states in Central Asia had a lot to learn. In similar vein,
Akayev called Turkey, “the morning star that guides the path of the Turkic republics.’’
(TDN, 1991; Sabah, 1992) As a result, in the immediate aftermath of the disintegration of
the SU excited by laudatorv' declaration of the Turkic leaders about Turkey, Turkish
policy-makers supposed that the republics would automatically accept Turkey as an older
brother, seek to emulate the Turkish model of political, economic and social development
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and provide Turkish businessmen with special lucrative opportunities for investment and 
trade.
The period of euphoria gave rise to all kinds of claims, assumption and 
speculations in Turkey and the West. Washington Post (1991) described Central Asia as a 
region which “consists mostly of Turkish-speaking Muslims, as a legacy of their days as 
part of the Ottoman Empire.” All appeared convinced that Turkey and the republics were 
bound to develop their relationship into a strong ethnically based regional grouping. The 
analysis of the Turkic republics in the Turkish press reflected this enthusiastic mood by 
referring to ‘Turkish republics’ assuming that their Turkishness was unquestioned or the 
most important part of their self-identification. Involvement with the Turkic republics 
was regarded in Turkey as a mandate and historical responsibility entrusted to Turkey.
Although such expectations were especially nurtured by certain nationalistic and 
religious circles which emphasized the need for a bloc or union of Turkic nations under 
Turkey’s leadership that would eventually become a powerful and recognised political 
actor in shaping the new international order, mainstream Turkish politicians were also 
quick to utilize the opportunity to show a bright picture of a new Turkic world stretching 
from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China. The emergence of Turkic republics 
provided an opportunity for the Turkish government to divert attention of the public 
opinion from domestic and international crisis such as inflation, terrorism, and cool 
relations with the EU. Hence, Demirel declared in February 1992 that with the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, ‘a gigantic Turkish world’ was currently being 
formed. (Cumhuriyet, 1992) Ozal accordingly told his countrymen and the world that the 
2U‘ century would become the Turkish century. (Tunander, 1995:414) Especially,
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Turkey’s far-centre right and far-right political paries welcomed the emergence of 50- 
million Muslim-Turkic people on the world stage. Particularly. Turkes, founder of NAP 
regarded the establishment of independent Turkic states as an affirmation of his beliefs 
and ideological principles. Turkey’s role in the former USSR was over-sold by Turkish 
politicians, who, when addressing the domestic audience, who exaggerated Turkey’s 
likely influence. Kamran Inan in March 1992 suggested that "Turkey is a candidate to be 
the strongest state in the West in the period after the year 2010.” (Miliyet, 1992; 
Pipes&Clawson, 1992/3:137)
Upon this background, it was a foregone conclusion in the early 1990s that 
Central Asia and Azerbaijan would become Turkey’s sphere of influence so that Turkey 
was regarded as one of the regional powers of the new international order, having 
influence in several regions: Central Asia, Transcaucasus, the Middle East, Black Sea and 
the Balkans. (Neumann, 1992) Turkey’s activities went so far as to display the images of 
pan-Turkism at least of a cultural type, and there was an open talk of a Turkish-speaking 
community of states stretching from the Adriatic Sea to the Chinese borderlands. 
Turkey’s common cultural, linguistic and religious bonds with the new republics were 
frequently mentioned both within and outside Turkey as a basis for influential position in 
the region. Hence, the speculations about the future of Turkey's relations with the Turkic 
Republics of Central Asia and Azerbaijan “ranged from the possible reorientation of 
Turkey's foreign policy eastward in a substantial diversion from its Western alignment, 
to the rise of a Turkic-based grouping of states destined to become a formidable new 
regional power in the world, with its parallel assertions of the reemergence of pan- 
Turkism.” (Carley, 1995:169)
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CHAPTER III
TURKISH INTERESTS, ACTIVITIES AND POLICY
3.1 Turkish Interests and Concerns
Although at the beginning cultural, linguistic and religious affinities were the
stimulating factors for cultivating closer ties. Turkey’s orientation towards the Turkic
republics has been based more on pragmatic economic and foreign policy considerations
than on simple nationalist or domestic political concerns. As Naumkin wrote:
"For Turkey, the relations with the republics appear not only as a means of satisfying its economic 
needs and interests, they are also an imponant political and ideological tool. It is not the question 
of pan-Turkic ideas per se which enjoy a rather limited influence in Turkey itself, but the use of 
the ethnic factor in shaping a new regional system under the auspices of Turkey, a Turkic universe 
of sorts.” (Zviagelskaya, 1994:138)
3.1.1 Strategic Interests
Turkish policy-makers aimed the formadon and extension of political, economic 
and cultural relations with the Turkic republics for some pragmatic policy objectives. 
Firstly, formation of close ties with the new republics would enhance Turkey’s regional 
power and influence. (Sayari, 1994:180) Opening of this new group of states has 
provided Turkey with an opportunity to pursue its goals of enhancing its own status as a 
regional power and restoring its political and strategic importance for the West along 
with its regional and international role that had encountered with the threat and challenge 
of serious decline in the very immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War. Turkey’s 
conviction that restoration of its relations with Central Asian and Transcaucasian region 
would brought about the restoration of its rightful place in international system, 
motivated close involvement there. Hence, success in forging close bilateral and regional
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links with Turkic states would serve Turkey’s interests by lessening its relative regional 
and international isolation, restoring its perceived international significance and role in 
the eyes of the West, and thus allowing it to emerge as a major regional power given 
considerable weakening of all the states in Turkey’s immediate neighbourhood in relation 
to its strengthening during the 1980s.
3.1.2 Psycho-Political Concerns
Another reason for Turkey’s interest in the Turkic republics is its wider 
perception of its own place in regional and international order. Especially in the early 
1990s, the Turkish model came to mean a secular state of Muslim majority, having 
market economy and multi-party system as well as close ties with the West. (Bal, 1998) 
In ideological terms, Turkey considers itself as the only secular and democratic Muslim 
country and as the right model to be emulated by other Muslim countries. In this regard, 
‘silent competition’ with Iran for the political affiliations of the new republics gave an 
additional spur to Turkish involvement in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia. 
Apprehending that secular nature of the Turkish regime could be threatened in the longer 
term if Iranian model becomes more attractive to the Turkic states, Turkish government 
regarded the establishment of close relations with Azerbaijan and Central Asian Turkic 
republics as vital to maintain regional balance and to prevent Iran from emerging as the 
dominant force of the new expanded Middle East. (Sayari, 1994:189)
For Turkish officials, one of the main motives for desiring to cultivate political 
relations with Central Asia and Transcaucasus was the domestic perception of Turkey’s 
relative regional isolation in cultural and diplomatic issues, compounded by the general
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public belief about the unreliability of its allies. Especially when faced with perceived 
experience of “rejection and betrayal at the hands of supposed friends,” the state of 
Turkish psyche has been reflected by the Turks in the phrase “the Turk has no other 
friend than the Turk.” (Robins, 1994: 67) The emergence of a belt of Turkic republics 
across Transcaucasus and former Soviet South raised the expectation for Turkey that the 
Turkic nature of these republics would not only give an end to the isolation of Turkey but 
also ensure the mutual loyalty of these states to Turkish interests. Given Turkey’s self­
perception of superiority in terms of its economy, democracy and international 
experience, Ankara envisaged a leadership role over these new republics. Hence, in 
addition to psychological boost Turkey expected practical support over a range of issues 
at international forums especially with respect to Cyprus question by virtue of its 
relations with such community of states. (Robins, 1994: 67)
3.1.3 Cultural Reasons
As Frank pointed out ethnicity (and culture) can be separated from political and 
economic relations neither at the level of nation-state nor internationally. (Frank, 1992: 
22-23) It was mainly because of its common culture, history and ethnicity with them that 
Turkey regarded the repubhcs as natural allies, which would support Turkey in 
international arena. (Bal, 1998:65) Moreover, rather than the original Western model 
itself, Turkish model, though still weaker than the former, became popular due to ethnic, 
linguistic and religious ties or common culture, both real and assumed.
Indeed, Turks in Turkey, Azeris, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kirgizs and Turkmens are 
regarded as being from the same origin and in the Turkic republics, languages of the
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same family are spoken by people majority of whom believe in Sunni sect of Islam.
Although European scholars underline the languages of the Turkic republics as
independent languages, majority of Turkish specialists as the popular Turkish perspective
and image, evaluate Turkic languages as ‘dialects’ of one another. Then-Minister of
Culture, FDcri Sağlar pointed out in 1992 that “the Turkish language has been the most
important unifying factor for the Turkic people who have been separated several
centuries ago.” Moreover, it is claimed that Turkic- Turkish has taken its place among the
six-most used languages in the world in terms of number of speakers. (Bal, 1998:61)
Fuller pointed out Turkey’s cultural affinities with the region as follows:
“Armed for the first time with the freedom to express their own ethnic and national interests, they 
(the Central Asian republics of the USSR) are in the process of returning to a closer sense of their 
own Turkish character...In Central Asia (or Turkestan) today, except for the Republic of 
Tajikistanwhich is Persian-speaking, all the Central Asian republics are Turkic in language and 
culture... they even find the Turkish of Turkey roughly comprehensible.” (F uller, 1992:36)
Manisali wrote, “the cultural and ethnic bonds existing between the people of Turkey and
of these republics create a natural environment, supported by the public opinion, for the
establishment of closer relationships." (Manisali, 1992:58) Bal argued in similar vein;
‘Turkic republics tended to follow the path or country they felt affinity with and with which they 
have cultural ties...Mainly because of the common culture between Turkey and the Turkic 
Republics, there is a positive public opinion in the Turkic Republics towards Turkey... a positive 
factor for the relationship.” (Bal, 1998)
Demirel stated ‘They are our cousins. We have a common culture, language, religion, 
history and literature.” (Frenchman, 1993:21) Accordingly, Ebulfez Elchibey, former 
president of Azerbaijan, said, “In the past, there was only one independent Turkish state, 
it was the Anatolian Turks who were our symbol for independence... we have fifty 
million Turkish brothers in Anatolia.” (Toker, 1992:61)
All levels of Turkish society -political parties, intellectuals, the media, public 
opinion etc.- supposed these newly independent republics to share a common culture.
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history and religion with Turkish people. Turkish officials and public opinion would not 
be so enthusiastic about and involved in forging close relations with Transcaucasus and 
Central Asia if it were not for the existence or assumed existence of these ties. Late 
president Demirel of Turkey emphasized the importance of sharing historical and cultural 
ties as follows:
“It is quite natural that Turkey acts by taking into account its national interests in terms of 
security, its economic and social relations. However, Turkey which considers its national interests 
in this issue, has some moral responsibilities...It is impossible to isolate yourself from your 
history. History offers opportunities as well as responsibilities and difficulties.” (Bal, 1998:60)
3.1.4 Economic Interests
One of the main reasons why former Soviet Transcaucasus and Central Asia was 
of immediate interest to Turkey was its recognition that there would be major economic 
benefits to seize. Turkey’s economic objectives and interests in its relations with the 
Turkic sates are in accordance with those of its general foreign economic policy based on 
the search for export markets along with export-oriented industrialisation and economic 
growth strategies initiated during 1980s. Especially enthusiastic talk about the abundance 
of hydrocarbon resources and other minerals led to excited expectations of rapid 
economic growth and business opportunities there. (Robins, 1994:71) So, especially at 
the beginning of post-Co Id War era, Turkish leadership had a very optimistic view of 
economic and business opportunities in Central Asia and Azerbaijan, and anticipated that 
Turkey’s export-oriented economic growth policies would benefit extensively from the 
extension of Turkey’s regional links and influence. Moreover. Turkey’s hope for 
becoming a geo-economic power through its position at the centre of a new network of 
road, rail, telecommunication and pipeline connections have been a major motivating 
factor in its desire for close relations with the former Soviet republics. Turkey would
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benefit especially from the construction of new pipelines across the Caspian and southern 
Caucasus in terms of lucrative transit fees and its own growing energy needs as well as 
making energy-rich Turkic republics of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan less 
dependent on Russia both economically and politically. (Winrow, 1998:93)
3.1.5 Security Concerns
Newly independent states, which have had independence thrust upon them, have 
faced a number of problems as the sources of threat to regional security and stability in 
Transcaucasus and Central Asia. Economic difficulties of the transition period, water 
scarcity, old contested borders and the presence of minorities especially 9.5 million 
Russian diaspora living in former Soviet Central Asia, given the absence of strong 
national identities, suggested that these former Soviet republics might fragment or realign 
along national, ethic and economic lines. (Winrow, 1995:22) Ankara reacted with 
considerable unease about the destabilising effects of ethnic and nationalist movements 
on Turkey’s regional environment and feared that these might draw Turkey into armed 
conflicts and exacerbate Turkey’s own ethnic problems. Thus, highly concerned 
especially about the volatile situation that has developed along its northeastern border in 
Transcaucasus, Turkey needed active and intense relations with the new republics in 
order to stabilize the region through diplomacy and regional economic linkages, and to 
encourage the peaceful formation of national identities.
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3.2 Turkey’s Relations with the Turkic Republics
3.2.1 Establishment of Diplomatic Relations
Mutual determination to forge a new relationship was reflected when Turkey 
became the first country to recognise the independence of Turkic republics. Even before 
their independence, Turkey had exchanged high level visits and signed various 
agreements with then-Soviet republics after their declarations of sovereignty. However, 
once the Turkish government recognised their independence and moved immediately to 
establish diplomatic missions in the region, informal relations that have developed 
between the republics and Turkish people during 1989-1991 were accelerated and 
accompanied by full formal state-to-state relations. Between late 1991 and early 1992 
leaders of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan visited 
Turkey and high-ranking Turkish delegations travelled to the capitals of the Turkic states. 
In December 1991. President Niyazov of Turkmenistan. President Karimov of 
Uzbekistan and President Akayev of Kyrgyzstan arrived on Turkey on 2 December, 16 
December and 22 December respectively. (Aydin, 1996:170) First international gathering 
took place in February 1992 when prime minister Demirel met with presidents of 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan while attending the meeting of World Economic 
Forum held in Switzerland. It was stated that there emerged a Turkish world extending 
from the Adriatic Sea to China in terms of culture, language and history, and that Turkey 
constituted a model for newly independent Turkic republics in this area. (Kut, 1996:379) 
Following the initial visits of Turkic leaders to Ankara. Turkish foreign minister 
Hikmet Çetin toured Central Asia in February-March 1992 including a visit to Farsi­
speaking and largely non-Turkic Tajikistan, to be followed two months later by Turkish
60
premier Demirel who was received in Central Asian Turkic states and Azerbaijan 
between late April and early May 1992. Cetin again travelled to the region with Catherine 
Laluimere. the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, in July 1992. Visits of Turkic 
leaders to Turkey was reciprocated also by president Ozal.who had travelled to Central 
Asia first in March 1991, when he was welcomed in Turkic states in April 1993. Apart 
from this initial exchange of visits, leaders of Turkey and the Turkic states met also 
during first ECO summit held in Teheran in February 1992, second ECO summit held in 
Ashkabad in May 1992, and at the Helsinki summit of CSCE in July 1992 in which 
Turkish delegation led by PM Demirel played an active role in forming a pressure group 
composed of Central Asian republics and Azerbaijan to mobilize support for Bosnia- 
Hercegovina. (Hürriyet, 1992)
During the period between 1991 and 1993, Central Asian, Azerbaijani and 
Turkish heads of state met as many as seven times. (Karpat, 1992-4:108) No other region 
has been travelled so often by Turkish leaders and high-ranking delegations than the new 
republics. Within the first year of independence alone, over 1,170 Turkish delegations 
had visited the region. (Hussain, 1993:14) These initial diplomatic interactions between 
the leaders of turkey and the Turkic republics were marked by emotional speeches and 
declarations attesting to the strength of ethnic and cultural ties. While the leaders of the 
Turkic republics emphasised Turkey's leadership role in the Turkic world and its 
potential to serve as a role model for themselves, Turkish officials declared their 
willingness to assist the concerned countries’ social and economic development. By 
spring 1992. Ankara had mounted a major diplomatic effort to establish Turkey as a 
leading outside actor in Transcaucasus and Central Asia. These intensive diplomatic
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contacts were aimed at establishing the foundations for further political, economic ad 
cultural links. As a result of these diplomatic activities, an extensive network of political, 
economic, infrastructural and cultural relations has been developed to be based on 
numerous official declarations, treaties and more than 400 agreements.
3.2.2 Political Relations
Following their independence, Turkey provided the new republics with 
considerable diplomatic and political support in their search for membership in 
international political and economic organizations so that their immediate entry in to the 
international spectrum would bolster their newly acquired independence. Turkey’s active 
diplomacy on behalf of them as well as its close relations with the US played an 
important role in their efforts for participating in such organizations as Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the North Atlantic Coordination Council 
(NACC), the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and Islamic Conference 
Organization (ICO).
Moreover, Turkey has also been instrumental in the creation of regional political 
and economic links especially concerning the revival and enlargement of Economic 
Cooperation Organisation (ECO). Founded in 1964 as the Regional Cooperation for 
Development, the organization was intended to foster economic and cultural cooperation 
among Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, US’s northern tier allies in the Middle East. Inactive 
after Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979, RCD was resuscitated as ECO which admitted 
the Turkic republics to membership during the Teheran Summit in February 1992 and 
Ashkabat Summit in May 1992. ECO established an institutional framework from the
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level of expert groups to the level of heads of state in order to promote multilateral 
cooperation among regional states. Moreover, Turkey has been the key factor in 
formulating the original idea of Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSECO) 
which includes also Azerbaijan among its ten-member states. Turkey’s support for the 
participation of the new Turkic republics in these regional and international organizations 
was based on a strategy to end their isolation from the West and to facilitate political 
stability and economic recovery in the region. (Sayari, 1994:182) Simsir wrote, “Turkey 
wishes to see the Turkic Republics develop in peace and stability, consolidate their 
independence and became strong, and supports their membership of international 
organizations.” (Simsir, 1992:15)
Turkey has been involved in seeking to develop relations with the republics in an 
institutional framework, creating a Turkic (Eastern) department in Turkish Foreign 
Ministry. Turkey established the Turkish International Cooperation Agency (TICA) in 
early 1992 to
“help Muslim Turkic Republics in the transition to democracy, economic reforms, improving 
transportation and communication, expanding TV broadcasts, restructuring and privatising public 
enterprises, establishing small and medium size enterprises, and implementing their educational programs.“
(Bilge, 1997)
Outstanding events concerning political activities and institutionalisation efforts of 
Turkey was so-called Turkic Summits, meetings of Turkish president with his 
counterparts from Turkic states.
First summit of leaders of Turkic-speaking states was held in Ankara on 30-31 
October 1992, with the participation of Azerbaijani president Ebulfez Elchibey, Kazakh 
president Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kirghiz president Askar Akayev, Uzbek president Islam 
Karimov and Turkmen president Saparmurad Niyazov. Turkish president Ozal declared
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in his opening speech that 21 ‘^ century would be the century of the Turks and announced 
the need to establish a Turkic Common Market together with a Development and 
Investment Bank. Turkish officials also expected that the summit would conclude with 
the release of separate Political and Economic Declarations and a Press Communique. 
(Winrow, 1995:24-25) However, the summit only concluded with vaguely worded 
Ankara Declaration short on detail and specific commitments. Introduction to the 
declaration announced the existence of special links between the six countries based on 
common culture, history and language and the spirit of solidarity dominating the 
relations. Political part of the declaration mentioned about unbreakable ties and common 
political aims between Turkic-speaking states and promoted joint efforts to resolve 
regional conflicts. Economic section envisaged cooperation between six states in the 
areas of technology, communications and oil-gas industries. (H.Hale, 1994:157) 
Alongside with Ankara Declaration, Turkey had planned to adopt one more document 
concerning the construction of a pipeline to export oil and gas from central Asia to 
Europe across Turkish territory, but Kazakh president Nazarbayev rejected the idea of a 
separate economic document.
At the first Turkic Summit, it was announced that a second summit would 
assemble at Baku in October 1993. but Turkic leaders failed to come together. Despite 
the Russian endeavours to prevent a second summit from taking place, five Turkic 
leaders including the new Azerbaijani president Haidar Aliyev, joined new Turkish 
president Demirel in Istanbul for the Turkic Summit on 19 October 1994. The deliberate 
scheduling of CIS summit in Moscow on October 21 1994 to follow the aftermath of 
Istanbul Summit was an expression of Moscow’s uneasiness with Turkish initiatives
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concerning Central Asia. In response to Russian concerns over the summit, Turkish 
foreign minister Mümtaz Soysal said, “The meeting is not intended to disrupt relations 
with Russia but to improve them through Central Asian countries...The territories are not 
a ground for competition or influence.” Similarly, Demirel stressed that Turkey did not 
regard Central Asia as a region for influence or competition, adding “further cooperation 
among people who share a common history, culture, language and religion should lead to 
enjoyment rather more than distastes.” (Deutsche Press-Agentur, 1994) The leaders 
praised the regular meetings of culture and education ministers, decided to prepare a 
comparative dictionary of various Turkic languages and discussed the transportation of 
Caspian oil and gas reserves to world markets. Unlike the first Turkic Summit, specific 
references to Nagarno-Karabakh conflict was made with the demands that Armenians 
should withdraw from all Azerbaijani territories and conform to UN Security resolutions. 
However, Kazakh president Nazarbayev though proposing the establishment of a special 
organization for cooperation, remained a problematic figure for Turkey as he was in the 
first Turkic Summit. (Winrow, 1998:97)
First to take place outside of Turkey, third Turkic Summit convened in Bishkek in 
August 1995, resulting in the Bishkek Declaration which was larger on rhetoric than on 
substance like its predecessors. Bishkek Declaration expressed support at the efforts of 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan towards integration process in Central Asia in 
which Turkey is not involved. Careful not to antagonize Russia, Turkic leaders promised 
to foster bilateral and multilateral ties in conformity with their obligations under the CIS. 
Karimov of Uzbekistan expressed his reservations about the effectiveness of cooperation 
among Turkic-speaking countries and called for Tajikistan and Turkmenistan to join in
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Central Asian Union formed in 1994. Turkmen president Niyazov stated that close 
attention to relations with Russia, Iran would go in hand with efforts directed towards 
regional integration with Turkey, and mentioned the inability of common language to 
become a platform for a political bloc. Moreover, Turkish president Demirel sought to 
allay Russian fears concerning the gatherings of ‘related communities’, but urged the 
latter to avoid becoming dependent on other states by moving their natural gas and oil 
through Turkey. (Omri Daily Digest, 1995)
Fourth summit held in Uzbek capital Tashkent on 21 October 1996 where 
Karimov stated the unity of Turkic states is based on historical, ethic, cultural as well as 
spiritual factors, but does not have political and military connotations. (RFE-RL, 1996) 
Fifth Turkic Summit took place in the new Kazakh capital on 9 June 1998 where again 
Uzbek president Karimov stated that previous summits had shown ‘unhealthy rivalry and 
competition,’ and argued that there should be limits to Turkic unity pointing to the 
example of Uyghurs in China’s Xinjiang province. (RFE-RL, 1998) Originally it was 
planned that the sixth summit would be held in June 1999 in Baku, but postponed due to 
Aliyev’s illness in spring 1999. Sixth Turkic Summit convened in Baku on 8 April 2000, 
ending with a call for cooperation on energy exports. Demirel predicted that “the 2U‘ 
century will be a century of strengthening ties between Turkic nations.’’ (RFE-RL, 2000) 
However, Uzbekistan’s president Karimov and Turkmenistan’s president Niyazov 
(Turkmenbasi) did not participate in the summit. While the former was angered by the 
suspicions about Turkey’s advocation of his opponents, the latter’s absence dashed the 
hopes for signing of an agreement between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan on a trans- 
Caspian Pipeline.
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3.2.3 Turkey’s Infrastructural Activities
Turkey’s most concrete efforts have been in the field of infrastructural provision.
According to Umut Arik, in Turkey’s program for assisting the new republics, three
general objectives were articulated to take precedence: “establishment of free and
efficient international communications and transportation connections, creation of
international banking links, and the generation of finance to ensure economic livelihood.’’
(Arik, 1992-4:34) In the absence of territorial contiguity with any of the Turkic republics
(except a 10 km short border with Azeri enclave of Nakhichevan), Turkey placed
considerable emphasis on the establishment of infrastructural links and devoted its
greatest endeavours to telecommunications which have been described as the ‘industrial
frontiersman’ of its Central Asian policy. (Financial Times, 1992) Robins rightly wrote:
“If Turkey can provide an infrastructural skeleton that connects it with these new states, then 
Ankara will have succeeded in locking these entities into an intimate and long-term relationship. 
In the political domain these newly independent republics have been to keep their options open 
with other influential neighbours such as Iran and Russia, whereas in the infrastructural field, 
Turkey is more favourably placed.” (Robins, 1993:604)
Turkey has been most active in transport and telecommunications in terms of 
infrastructural development. Transportation agreements were signed with the purpose of 
opening up trade routes needed for economic development in the republics but due to 
unsettled situation in the Transcaucasus, the realization of free transport by road has not 
been achieved. Turkey sought the establishment of land transport links with the republics 
by a link with Azerbaijan via Nakhichevan and Iran, and then to the central Asian 
Republics by train ferry across the Caspian. Furthermore, air transport protocols and civil 
aviation agreements have enabled for Turkish airlines to establish regular flights between 
Istanbul, Baku, Tashkent, Almaty, Ashkabad and Bishkek. An impressive
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telecommunications network have been established through the work of PTT (Turkish 
General Directorate in Post, Telegraph and Telephone) and Netas, a Turkish subsidiary of 
Canada’s Northern Telecom in order to expand the republics’ connection with the outside 
world via Turkey.
3.2.4 Turkey’s Cultural Activities
Turkish governments have made concerted efforts to encourage further cultural 
links with Turkic republics and achieved greater success when compared with its political 
and economic activities, in implementing its educational and cultural programs in the 
republics. Language reform has constituted an important part of Turkish endeavours at 
long-term orientation of the Turkic republics towards Turkey. Turkey’s vigorous 
campaign for the adoption of Latin script and its opposition to the replacement of Cyrillic 
with Arabic, derived from its desire to enhance its cultural influence and to undermine 
the appeal of religious fundamentalism there.
With the consideration that switching to Latin alphabet would eventually remove 
most of dialectical differences between the Turkic languages and forge even closer links 
at the cultural and commercial levels, Turkey ahs been claiming that Latin alphabet will 
make the republics more accessible to Western ideology and technology. In turn, Turkic 
leaders in order to highlight the predominance of economic priorities, have used the 
argument that just as the adoption of Cyrillic enabled the republics to become 
incorporated into the socialist system more rapidly, conversion to Latin will facilitate 
their transition to capitalist market system. (Pamir, 1993:51) Following Azerbaijan, 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have finally decided to adopt Latin script by 1995-6,
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Kazakhstan and Kyryzstan have also provisionally agreed. Scholars from Turkey and 
Turkic republics prepared a new comparative dictionary of the main Turkic languages in 
order to facilitate communication.
Turkish policy-makers have also identified the area of human resources as crucial 
to developing its longer-term ties with the new states. Turkish government ahs provided
10,000 scholarships to enable students from Turkic republics to attend Turkish schools 
and universities “in the expectation that these students will form the future cadres of 
educated elites that will direct the reshaping of their countries into democratic, liberal, 
secular, peaceful, prosperous, secure and stable open societies." (Arik, 1992-4:35) As of 
September 1999, 4242 students from Turkic republics attend schools in Turkey. (Official 
Gazette, 1999:88) Educational and cultural activities sponsored by Turkey included visits 
by Turkish experts in order to discuss issues regarding the formation of democratic 
political institutions constitution-writing etc. Turkey also initiated training programs for 
Turkic peoples for specialisation in various government institutions such as foreign 
services, military, central-banking etc. All Turkic states concluded military training 
cooperation agreements with Ankara and sent students to Turkey’s military academics. 
Furthermore, investments by Anatolian businessmen of small and medium size led to the 
establishment of more than 140 secondary educational institutions in Turkic republics in 
order to create socioeconomic infrastructure for Turkey’s relations with them. (Manisali,
1997)
Another major cultural and educational project undertaken by Turkey regards the 
establishment of the Eurasian television network system. As in the case of Turkey’s 
initiative in advocating the Latin script, Eurasian TV project is intended to contribute to
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expand Turkey’s cultural influence in the region through fostering greater familiarity 
with the Turkish and Latin script. Completing the project in a record-breaking time, 
Turkey started satellite TV broadcasting to Azerbaijan and Central Asia in April 1992, 
establishing the second largest network after CXN in terms of geographical scope. 
(Hürriyet, 1992)
3.2.5 Turkey’s Economic Activities
As regards its economic relations with the Turkic republics, Turkey pursued 
trading and industrial activities, made tourism and construction investments and provided 
financing and subsidies. (Manisali, 1997) According to figures for 1993, imports from 
Turkey amounted to 22.5,19,16.7 and 16 percent of imports made by Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan, respectively whereas in the same year only 
5.8, 4.5, 3.5, and 3.4 percent of exports from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan respectively were destined for Turkey. (Winrow, 1998:103) Non-existent 
before 1990. Turkey’s trade volume with the republics increased from 145 million in 
1992 to 5.6 billion in 1999. (MFA, 2000) Turkey takes the first place in Azerbaijan’s 
imports and export, and second and third places in Turkmenistan’s and Uzbekistan’s 
imports, respectively. In turn Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan take the first places in Turkey’s 
exports and imports regarding the five Turkic republics. In 1998, while Turkey’s exports 
to Turkic republics constituted 3.2% of Turkey’s total exports, its imports from there was 
only 0.9% of its total and Turkey’s total trade volume with the republics formed only 
1.7% of its overall foreign trade. (Official Gazette, 1999:89-91)
70
As of 1999, total volume of credits Turkey has allotted to Central Asian states 
through Turkish Eximbank is around $ 1.5 billion. Far from offering the possibility of 
real stimulation of their economies, Turkey's credits are considerable commitments and 
have made turkey the fifth largest provider of aid to Turkic republics after the US, EC 
and Japan. Moreover, Turkish businessmen have considerably extended their activities in 
Turkic republics especially through small and medium scale enterprises playing an 
important role in the development of market economies there with the initiative of TICA. 
Around 2,500 Turkish companies are currently involved in various investment projects 
worth over $8.4 billion and construction services totalling over $4 billion. (MFA, 2000)
3.2.6 Pipelines Issue and Energy Politics
Among the various fields of cooperation between turkey and the Turkic republics, 
pipelines and energy issues have received special attention, especially since 1993 as 
Turkey emerged as customer, participant and transit country. (İskit, 1996) On December 
1994, Azerbaijani government signed the ’contract if the century’ with Azerbaijani 
International Operating Company (AIOC), a business consortium of oil companies from 
various states including Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) with its initial 1.75% 
and eentual 6.75% stake in $7.4 billion oil production-sharing agreement concerning 
Azeri, Chiraq and Guneshli oil fields. (Sasley, 1998)
With world’s 17*'’ largest economy and 65 million people, Turkey’s energy needs 
became an important aspect of its foreign policy due to annual growth of its energy 
demand by 8% well above world average of 1.8%. (MFA, 2000) According to Turkish 
Energy Ministry, Turkey’s oil imports are expected to reach from 22 to 45 million tons
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by 2010 and gas demand to 45 billion cubic meters by 2005. (Aras&Foster, 1998) Thus, 
Turkey has embarked upon big projects involving the transportation of oil and gas 
reserves in the Caspian basin through its territory, namely Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil 
pipeline and Trans-Caspian gas pipeline projects, which are both economic lifeline and 
centrepiece of an ambitious foreign policy to overcome the obstacles to Turkey’s 
economic linkages with Central Asia. (Financial Times, 1993)
Nevertheless, Moscow has wanted to ensure that any new oil and gas pipelines 
constructed across Central Asia and Transcaucasus cross Russian territory in order for 
Russia to maintain control over the Turkic republics. Also, it sought to preserve its grip 
on energy resources by insisting that the Caspian Sea is not an international sea but a lake 
so as for Russia to veto the development of offshore oilfields, and to obstruct the possible 
construction of underwater oil and gas pipelines. (Winrow, 1996) In mid-July 1995. 
Russia foreign ministry sent diplomatic notes to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan, threatening the safety of all Caspian Sea-related projects launched without 
its consent. (TDN, 1995) Sensitive to Russian concerns, they proceeded cautiously. 
Visiting Almaty in August 1995, Turkish PM Ciller was disappointed when failing to 
secure definite commitments from Nazarbayev concerning Kazakhstan’s contribution to 
the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline. Accordingly, during her visit to Ashkabad in August 1995, 
Niyazov informed Ciller that construction of a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Central 
Europe via Turkey was no longer a priority. (Winrow, 1998:55). and proposed that some 
Turkmen gas could be delivered to Turkey via a future extended pipeline across Russia 
and Georgia. (Winrow, 1996)
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Firstly launching their project of a Caspian-Mediterranean pipeline in December 
1994, Turkish officials have been determined in connecting a possible Kazakh oil and 
Turkmen gas pipeline with a new pipeline linking Baku with the Turkish Mediterranean 
port of Ceyhan. Turkish government and Turkish State Pipeline Agency (BOTAS) have 
been exploring the possibility of transporting 25 million tons of oil from Azerbaijan and 
another 20 million tons from Tenghiz oil field in Kazakhstan in order for Baku-Ceyhan to 
be economically viable. (Winrow, 1998:93) However, oil produced in Kazakhstan is 
transported to Russia across several pipelines, including one route from Tenghiz to 
Novorossisk via unstable Grozny, and Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) works for the 
construction of a new pipeline to b\pass it. Concerning natural gas, Turkey signed a deal 
with Iran in 1996 to purchase $23 billion worth of gas over next 23 years and concluded 
an agreement in December 1997 with Turkmenistan and Iran to build a pipeline.
For the transportation of the early oil, to be drilled from three Azeri fields, there 
were two reduced options: a northern route (Baku-Novorossisk) and a western route 
(Baku-Soupsa). Turkey actively supported the western route, making proposals towards 
the financing Baku-Soupsa line and promising to buy its oil because opening of an export 
outlet outside Russian system would increase the chances of Turkish project and Baku- 
Tbilisi section of Baku-Soupsa line could constitute the first step of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
route. (İskit, 1996) In October 1995, Azerbaijani government and AIOC agreed that early 
oil extracted from three offshore oilfields in the Caspian would be transported both via 
Russian and western routes.
Turkey objected to the AIOCs initial indications that it would prefer Bciku- 
Novorossisk as the main export pipeline, and actively campaigned for Baku-Ceyhan as
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economically viable, secure and environmentally safe export route, fostering better 
relations with Azerbaijan. Turkmenistan, Georgia and oil companies especially after 1997 
when first Azeri oil was piped to Novorossisk to be shipped through Turkish Straits to the 
Mediterranean. Main themes of Turkey’s arguments involved; “Ceyhan’s ability to 
handle large amounts of oil. the fact that due to environmental and ecological reasons the 
Bosphorus cannot manage more oil traffic, and playing on the US desire to keep Russia 
and Iran from any significant control or benefit from oil transportation routes.” (Sasley,
1998). Turkish leaders stated their stand over the pipelines issue based on the involved 
political, economic and strategic benefits for the Turkic states, and underlined that Baku- 
Ceyhan line was needed to lessen the economic and political dependence of Caspian 
states on Russia. (Olcay, 1999:34) Turkey became successful in bringing other countries 
to its point of view. US government has announced for several times that it backs a 
Turkish pipeline within the framework of its multiple pipelines policy for the Caspian 
region as a way of somewhat repaying for the losses Turkey suffered during 1990s and 
Gulf War due to the closure of Iraqi pipeline and the cut of border trade. In December 
1997, Aliyev stated to suppon plans to use Turkey as a transit route for Capian oil, and in 
October 1998, presidents of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, 
and the US Secretary of Energy confirmed their support so that it is unlikely for oil 
companies to disregard this relative consensus (Cornell, 1999:101) Reflecting Turkey’s 
willingness to ensure its own economic and security needs, BOTAS guaranteed, in case 
the calculated cost of $2.4 bn is exceeded, to cover the difference by paying $2.58 per 
barrel as transportation cost (Gurlesel, 1999:89), and Turkey even stated in May 1998
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that if Baku-Ceyhan route is not selected by the AIOC, it may consider hiring a private 
company to develop its portion of the line. (TDN, 1998)
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey signed the intergovernmental agreement during 
the OSCE Summit in Istanbul in November 1999, forming the legal framework of Baku- 
Ceyhan main export pipeline and the Istanbul declaration signed by presidents of 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Turkey and the US constituted a firm commitment to 
realize this project by 2004. The next step is to focus on activities for providing 
additional oil commitments to the pipeline and securing finance. Recently. Georgia and 
Azerbaiajn agreed on transit fees. However, Kazakh president Nazarbayev before Turkic 
summit in Baku said that Kazakhstan is not ready to guarantee any volumes of oil to 
Baku-Ceyhan, hence making clear that its first commitments are to Russian export routes. 
Moreover, an intergovernmental declaration on Trans-Caspian natural gas pipeline was 
signed by Turkey, Turkmenistan, Georgia and Azerbaijan again during the OSCE 
Summit. But, high costs, Turkmen priority for Iran and Turkish-Russian agreement on 
Blue Stream Project with 16 bcm capacity hinder the realization of this project in the 
short term. Moreover, the recent agreement between new Russian president Putin and 
Turkmen president Niyazov to sell 50 bcm of Turkmen natural gas to Russia for 30 years 
put at risk the Trans-Caspian pipeline project. (TDN, 2000) Also, as Baku-Ceyhan still 
needs extra oil to be feasible, without Turkmen natural gas, its profitability might be 
further suspected due to high costs involved (S3.5 billion according to AIOC estimates) 
along with a need for a price of at least $15 per barrel.
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3.3 Turkey’s Vision and Strategy
Turkish analysts and policy-makers advocated a policy of seeking to bring Turkey
into some type of privileged relationship with the Turkic republics without trying to
establish Turkish domination over them. As one analyst put it;
“Principal objective of Turkish foreign policy towards the Turkish republics in Central Asia 
should be conceived as helping these countries to become pluralist, secular democracies respectful 
of the rule of law, progressing towards a market economy to adopt Turkey as a model on the basis 
of mutual advantage.” (Tashan, 1993:161)
Temel İskit wrote in a similar vein;
“Turkey is actually strving to bolster political and economic ties with them on the basis of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, equality and mutual benefits, the main objective being to 
contribute to their efforts to overcome their severe economic problems and to carry out their 
transition to democracy and a market economy.” (İskit. 1996)
Turkey enunciated a clear policy of cooperating with new Turkic republics to consolidate
their independence with a desire to ensure that Russia does not acquire undue influence
over them or reincorporate them into a new imperial state. (Harris, 1995:22) Because if
independent, secular and democratic states with liberal economies were to emerge in the
republics, these would be more closely linked to turkey rather than to Russia or Iran. For
that purpose declaring that it would develop its relations with the republics only on the
basis of “respect for sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, non-interference in
international affairs, equal rights and common benefits,” (Newspot, 1991) Turkey has not
tried to dominate Turkic Central Asia and Azerbaijan but instead expected to extend its
sphere of influence by concluding hundreds of cooperative agreements. Turkey has
actually sought to become the centre, the first among equals economically, politically and
culturally. Instead of focusing on those republics of most importance to it, Turkey has
placed all republics to travel schedules of senior politicians and dispatched diplomatic
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missions, thereby trying self-consciously not to discriminate among the republics in order 
to reinforce the view about the Turkic republics as if they were one entity.
Turkey moved quickly to capitalize on its common cultural, religious and 
linguistic heritage with the region as well as its relative success in restructuring its 
economy and a highly valued geopolitical position. (Sowerwine, 1995:33) Turkey 
adopted a strategy, medium to long-term, that aims exploit and mobilize its cultural, 
ethnic and linguistic ties with the Turkic republics. (Hyman, 1997:347) Moreover, 
Turkey’s approach also involved the reincorporation of the West into efforts to bring 
development, putting Turkey in a position of building a bridge between the West and 
Central Asia. Concerning the opening of a bridge in May 1992, linking turkey and 
Nakhichevan across the river Aras as an important symbol of Turkey’s close ties to 
Azerbaijan, PM Demirel said, ‘This bridge connects not only Turkey and Azerbaijan, but 
also Europe with Asia and the Caucasus.” (Ehteshami, 1994:109)
By regarding regional cooperation important for stability and peace, playing a 
dynamic role in connecting the Turkic states to the rest of the world, helping them in their 
‘quest for identity’ (Fuller, 1994), and seeking to foster the peaceful formation of national 
identities through emphasizing common ethic Turkic links, Turkey has eventually 
emerged as stabilizing factor for Transcaucasus and Central Asia. Persisting fears in the 
West and Russia about religious fundamentalism gaining stronghold in Central Asia has 
enabled Turkey to capitalize on this perception to advance its own interests. In turn, ‘‘the 
search for national identity and the need for economic restructuring-currently constitute 
the most urgent items on these countries national agendas,” accounted for the
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expectations and concerns of the Turkic states regarding Turkish activities in the region. 
(Pamir, 1993:50)
Although the emergence of the Turkic republics and Turkey’s growing role have
strengthened national sentiments in Turkish public, there is little evidence to support the
claim that pan-Turkism and irredentism have been motivating force in Turkey’s relations
with Central Asia and Transcaucasus. While overwhelming public support for the
enhancement of Turkey’s relations with the region has established a broad domestic
policy consensus for Turkey’s concerned political, economic and cultural initiatives, the
concept of forming a larger Turkish political entity or a new Turkestan does not get
popular allegiance bearing in mind historical memories. As Fuller observed, “public
interest in the Turks living outside Turkey is one thing, the willingness to devote
resources to new policies is something else,” and “the public opinion in Turkey is not
universally in favour of a nationalist Turkish foreign policy.” (Fuller, 1993:69-70) A
public consensus seemed to emerge that formation of some kind of a political union of
Turkic states would be detrimental to Turkish interests as well as to the quality of
relations. (Kirisci, 1995:17) Turkish officials have repeated on several occasions that
Turkey’s policies were not based on the ideology and objectives of pan-Turkism. (Sayari,
1994:190-191) Following quote by late-president Demirel indicates the nature of
Turkey’s envisaged relationship with the new republics:
“It would be a great mistake to evaluate Turkish assistance to these states as the pursuit of a policy 
of pan-Turkism...Turkey is not seeking monopolistic hegemony over relations with these states. 
On the contrary, its aim is to increase their ties with the outside world. In short, Turkey believes 
that it can help these republics in their long-overdue attempt to integrate with the world, and at the 
same time help them stand on their own feet.” (Landau, 1995:222)
Then-Foreign Minister Cetin evaluated it natural for Turkey to seek close cooperation
with the Turkic republics due to “shared history, religion, ethnic ties and language,” and
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added his government having no intention of pursuing the policy of pan-Turkism. 
(Smolansky, 1994:283)
However, as different from the political pan-Turkism, cultural pan-Turkist 
overtones of Turkey’s outlook or the idea of establishing a cultural unity among all 
Turks-Turkic people, have been reflected in Ankara’s strategy of promoting Turkish 
culture and language in the Turkic republics through previously mentioned various 
activities. (Winrow, 1992) Cultural pan-Turkism was a more realistic and attractive 
option for Turkey, which could become the centre among different states sharing 
common culture and similar traditions in a projected Turkic culture area. (Winrow, 
1995:283) The goal would not be Turkish irredentism but rather finding compensation in 
political, economic and cultural influence in Turkic world. (Fuller, 1990) Nevertheless, 
keeping the balance between existing hopes of establishing a special relationship with 
some kind of Turkish preferential position in the foreign relations of Turkic republics, 
and restricting Turkish policy vis-à-vis the republics to normal foreign relations without 
any bid for pan-Turkic regional leadership proved to be a difficult one for Turkey. 
(Kramer, 1996) because at least Turkish officials could not prevent their words and 
actions being misinterpreted especially by Russian political and military circles.
PM Demirel’s declaration in February 1992 that with the collapse of the SU, there 
emerged a gigantic Turkish world stretching from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China 
(Cumhuriyet, 1992) was took as evidence. In April 1992 during his visit to the republics, 
Demirel declared that Turkey did not have any intention of patronising the republics, but 
at the same time, referred to the prospects for forming “an association of independent 
Turkic states,” but in which Turkey would not have a predominant say, as he added.
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considering their experience with the Soviet domination. (TDN, 1992) Demirel again in 
February 1993, referring to Central Asia and Azerbaijan, announced that a new Eurasian 
community composed of Turks has evolved. Although Turkey would not administer 
them, it would lead them to the world and there were great hopes for this Turkic-Turkish 
world in the next century. (TDN, 1993) Demirel’s references can be interpreted as an 
attempt to foster an increased awareness of a wider cultural community among regional 
states, passing through nation-building process. However, his follower PM Ciller in 
Moscow in September 1993 reportedly criticised Demirel·’ repeated use of slogans 
referring to an enlarged Turkic-Turkish world for undermining the trust between Turkey 
and Russia. (Hürriyet, 1993)
Assessing the role of various groups, including government officials, ministries, 
political parties, interest groups and academics, with pan-Turkic sympathies and 
divergent agendas in attempting to influence Turkish policy vis-à-vis Turkic republics, 
Winrow concluded that, “the MFA appears to be engaged in a difficult balancing act, 
attempting to reconcile these various groupings and interests while not disturbing 
relations with Moscow or the West.” (Winrow, 1997) Alparslan Turkes, founder of 
Nationalist Action Party (NAP), whom Demirel surprisingly included in his entourage to 
visit Central Asia, claimed the need to establish a Turkic Commonwealth or Association 
which would have a High Council of Turkic Republics of Presidents, Prime Ministers and 
Foreign Ministers that would meet several times a year under a revolving presidency. 
(TDN, 1992) Turkes especially played an important role in convening the General 
Assemblies of the Turkic States and Communities Friendship, Brotherhood and 
Cooperation Foundation (TUDEV), attended and addressed by presidents Ozal and
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Demire 1, and PM Ciller. According to Winrow, even Turkish Ministries of Culture and 
Education emerged to share pan-Turkic sympathies as well, the former establishing the 
Turkic Cultures and Arts Joint Administration. (TURKSOY) (Winrow, 1998:101) 
Turkish MFA has been concerned that Russia could not possibly distinguish between 
official Turkish policy and ‘separate Turkish policies” advocated by different groups as 
well as between Turkic Summits and pan-Turkic oriented meetings.
3.4 Evolution of Turkish Policy towards the Turkic Republics
As Turkey’s relations with the Transcaucasus and Central Asia expanded during 
the period between 1991 and 1993 with the extensive coverage of the region in the 
Turkish media and visits by several officials, businessmen, journalists and academics, 
Turkish public and policy-makers have developed a better apprehension about the 
existing conditions in the Turkic republics. More sober and less ambitious analysis of 
Turkey’s policy objectives and potential regional role started replacing unrealistic and 
exaggerated expectations of the early period. (Sayari, 1994:181) Avoiding early euphoria, 
Turkish policy-makers recognised their capabilities and limits of influence so that 
Turkish policy vis-à-vis Turkic republics started to follow a more realistic and balanced 
course. By 1993, as Ercan Ozer wrote, “after two years of inevitable soul searching a 
more pragmatic and realistic policy synthesised from the juxtaposition of a thesis of 
active engagement laden with high somewhat sentimental expectations and the antithesis 
of passive involvement.” (Ozer, 1997) Turkish officials adopted a more realistic and 
circumspect approach to former Soviet south especially in the aftermath of Ankara 
Summit in October 1992 when Turkic heads of state refused to approve plans for a
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Turkic Common Market along with a Turkic Development and Investment Bank, forcing 
Turkish government to reevaluate its position in the region, hence marking a turning- 
point in Turkey’s relations with the Turkic states. (Winrow, 1995:24) Moreover, 
Turkey’s relations with the region have entered a more mature and realistic phase also 
owing to the events concerning Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict over Nagarno-Karabakh, 
and the initiation of Russia’s ‘Near Abroad’ policies in 1993. This new policy line of 
Turkey reflected itself in the shift from macro-level projects to low-key attempts.
Turkey’s overall policy towards the Turkic republics underwent a major 
experience and a severe test in Transcaucasus. Ebulfez Elchibey, the leader of nationalist 
Popular Front had pulled Azerbaijan out of the CIS and accepted Turkish model, 
believing that Turkey could help resolve in Azeri favour the Nagarno-Karabakh conflict. 
However. Turkey’s relations with Azerbaijan became strained due to the inability of 
Turkey to stop the Armenian forces. Turkey’s closing down Armenia’s communication 
routes over its territory did not suffice to prevent Armenians from occupying one-fifth of 
Azeri territory and dislocating 1 million (one-eight) of its people. Armenian attacks and 
occupation of Azeri territory along the Lachin corridor to Nagarno-Karabakh have 
heightened public pressure on the Ankara government to adopt a more aggressive 
position. When Armenian forces advanced on Nakhichevan, 10 km east of the Turkish 
border, Haidar Aliyev, then-leader of the enclave complained that ‘Turkey was not doing 
enough to stop the Armenians,” and some opposition members and president Ozal 
demanded urgent intervention by stressing that right to be guaranteed to Turkey under the 
Kars Treaty of 1921, according to which Ankara has to be consulted before any changes 
in the status of Azeri enclave of Nakhichevan, Turkey’s lifeline to the Caucasus and
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Central Asia, and the only Turkic entity with which Turkey has a common border, (the 
Middle East, 1992)
During his visit to Central Asia, Ozal argued that dropping a few shells on 
Armenia and sending a brigade of soldiers would be enough to stop the Armenian 
aggression. (Cumhuriyet, 1993) Turkish military intervention might have transformed it 
into a wide international conflict, involving Russia and other CIS republics bound by the 
Tahkent Collective Security Treaty. However, Demirel government tried to balance 
domestic calls for intervention with the need to mobilize the support of international 
community in order to avoid any action that could exacerbate the conflict and might be 
interpreted as a pursuit of irredentist claims.
But, Turkey was excluded from participation in major mediation groups, fact­
finding commissions, and the arrangement of cease-fire agreements. Then, the fall of 
Elchibey in June 1993 and his replacement in 1993 by Aliyev as well as the country’s 
inclusion into the CIS in September 1993 worked to the strategic detriment of Turkey and 
undermined Turkish influence in the region. However, in the latter part of 1994, Turkish- 
Azeri relations improved once more when Aliyev refused to permit Russian troops to be 
stationed in his country and promised to give Turkey a small share in the AIOC. 
Nevertheless, as Karpat wrote,
“Turkey failed to keep Azerbaijan at a crucial moment on a vital matter, and thus revealed her own 
serious strategic military deficiencies. The central Asian states all drew their conclusions from the 
fall of democratic regime of Azerbaijan and began to appraise more realistically both their own 
strategic-economic potential, and their relations with turkey.” (Karpat, 1992-4:113)
Turkey’s inability to keep Azerbaijan within its sphere of influence generated 
intense criticism inside, with the press stating lack of a firm policy pushing Azerbaijan 
into Russian arms. Cemil Onal, a former Turkish deputy and state-minister in Elchibey’s
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cabinet complained that “Azerbaijan was delivered to the Russians” by Ankara’s lack of
vision. (Onal, 1993:43) By 1993 while the influence of Russia in the region growing,
Turkey sought to improve relations with Russia. In this context some intellectuals
charged that Ankara’s foreign policy remained tied to a counterproductive pro-Western
stance, making it unable to exploit the opportunities provided with the collapse of the SU.
Malik Muftu wrote about such alleged criticisms that;
“Turkey must chart its own course if it seeks to ward off new threats or exploit new opportunities. 
If the Americans appear to be sanctioning a Russian Monroe Doctrine in the former SU, if a new 
Yalta is being arranged that will leave Turkey isolated once again...then Turkey must learn to say 
no...Turkey must shift instead to an independent region-based foreign policy.” (Mufti, 
1998:47)
The Western analysts who had predicted in the wake of Soviet collapse that 
Turkey would compete with Russia and Iran for spheres of influence in the former Soviet 
south, were stating Russia in a dominant position in its Near Abroad while pointing to the 
insufficiency of Turkey’s resources. (Bolukbasi, 1997:80) Pessimistic mood and 
disillusionment in Turkey after the change in Azerbaijani government and renewed fear 
about Russian neo-imperialism were somewhat exaggerated. Despite a decrease from 
intense relations of 1991-3 period, Turkey has maintained its cooperative relations with 
the region and gained support of Caspian states for energy exports through Turkey. By 
demonstrating the limits of an eastward-looking strategy, these disappointments then has 
shifted Turkey’s attention more towards the question of its integration with Europe. 
(Hunter, 1999:75)
“A weak, fragmented and competitive approach,” in Turkish foreign policy­
making since 1994 has reflected the confusion of domestic party politics. During 
Erbakan-Ciller coalition between June 1996 and June 1997, PM Erbakan urged a foreign 
policy to improve Turkey’s relations with Muslim countries, reflected in his D-8
84
initiative (not including the Turkic republics), but he could not replace Turkey’s western 
orientation. (Robins, 1997) At the end of 1997, Turkey’s foreign policy options were 
severely restricted after the disappointments experienced at the Teheran Summit of OIC 
and the Louxemburg meeting of the EU so that Turkey’s despair concerning its Islamic 
and European allies led to the speculation that it could turn its face towards Russia and 
Turkic states. (Bingöl, 1998:3) Turkish hopes were dashed especially when the EU 
placed Turkey in a special category allowing former communist countries to move ahead 
of it. (Kubicek, 1999:163) Nevertheless, OSCE Istanbul Summit in November 1999 and 
EC Helsinki Summit in December 1999 seemed to give new hopes for Turkey concerning 
its priorities in foreign policy, namely European integration and Eurasia (Turkic 
republics). Having passed through various phases ranging from “excessive optimism to 
extreme pessimism and brief experimentation with an Islamic ally-oriented foreign 
policy” (Hunter, 1999:78), Turkish policy towards former Soviet South has been 
generally predominated by ‘daring’ when analysed within the paradigm of daring versus 
caution.
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CHAPTER IV
CONSTRAINTS AND IMPEDIMENTS TO TURKISH 
INFLUENCE
4.0 Non-Fulfilment of Initial Expectations for Turkish Influence
In the period after the disintegration of the SU, with the emergence of Turkic 
world, Turkey had heady expectations about establishing a major influence in 
Transcaucasus and Central Asia, believing that ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural 
affinities with the region would pave the way for the establishment of close ties and a 
major presence there. In most of the analysis, there seemed little doubt thaf Turkey would 
assume a leading role in the development of newly independent Turkic states through 
serving a political and economic model based on the ethnic and linguistic kinship of 
Turkish and the Turkic peoples, and that this new relationship was certain to alter both 
the orientation of Turkish foreign policy and the strategic alignment of the whole region 
itself. However, there have existed some serious obstacles for the realization of such 
expectations and ideas. Hence, Carley wrote;
“Now that the initial euphoria has waned, it has become apparent that cooperation between Turkey
and Central Asia is not going to take on the form of a Turkic-based grouping, and that Turkey’s
relations with this part of the world are not necessarily going to be as strong as once proclaimed.
Certainly no political union, federation, or confederation is foreseen.” (Carley, 1995:188)
4.1 Turkey’s Domestic and Economic Constraints
Turkey’s own limitations among a number of factors have appeared as the most 
serious factor inhibiting it from playing the leadership role at least in cultural and 
economic terms for which it aspired with respect to the new republics. Especially 
Turkey’s inability to help pro-Turkish president Elchibey of Azerbaijan and reverse the
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reassertion of Russian influence in the Transcaucasus has illustrated the gap between its 
regional goals and capabilities. With its domestic economic challenges and the 
aggravation of its social and national problems, Turkey’s policy impasse highlighted the 
fact that its strategic, political, economic and military ways and means did not suffice to 
realize its 1991-93 objective of establishing a zone of Turkish influence in Transcaucasus 
and Central Asia. Zviagelskaya wrote, "political expectations placed on the Turkish- 
Turkic relations obviously exceed the capabilities of Turkey which is also facing a 
number of limitations,” including Islamic reawakening, Kurdish problem, systemic 
breaches of human rights etc. putting "severe restrictions on Ankara’s foreign policy.” 
(Zviagelskaya, 1994:139-140) Similarly. Mackenzie stated that "Turkey has too many 
unresolved domestic problems to become an imperial-style power.” (Mackenzie, 
1993:25-26)
Turkey’s high inflation rates, large budget deficits, socio-economic costs of 
Kurdish insurgency and capital resources heavily engaged in GAP Project and substantial 
military modernization program, all suggested a broad unfinished domestic agenda that 
constrained Turkey both economically and fiscally for playing a leading role in the 
former Soviet Turkic republics. (Blank. 1993) Particularly as a developing economy and 
suffering from a serious economic crisis since 1994, Turkey does not posses the capital 
and resources to help the Turkic states in their difficult transition period. In an emotional 
and euphoric atmosphere of their initial contacts with the Turkic leaders, expecting that 
the West and particularly the US would make a substantial contribution to economic 
recovery of the new republics via Turkey, Turkish officials made promises of economic 
aid that proved impossible to fulfil through Turkey’s own limited resources. However,
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Turkey did not receive the anticipated economic and financial support for the new 
republics, and although Turkey’s financial aid to the region constituted a large item 
among its deposits of hard currency, it still could not meet Ankara’s initial pledges and 
the immense needs of the region, thereby undermining the initial assumptions about 
Turkey’s strength and prestige, and even causing some resentment there. Moreover, 
Turkey’s investments in and trade with the five states have remained quite insubstantial 
because Turkish companies and businessmen, though initially eager to cultivate 
commercial ties, discovered that political and economic conditions in the region present 
major obstacles, including limited cash assets available, existence of  ^price controls, 
absence of banking infrastructure and the preference of the governments to conduct trade 
through barter deals or soft credits. Furthermore, Turkish government also has not yet 
succeeded in realizing its pipeline projects for several reasons including opposition from 
Russia and Iran, security problem in Transcaucasus, availability of shorter routes to 
Russian or Iranian seapons as well as the problem of finance.
4.2 Russian Factor and Its ‘Near Abroad’ Policies
Just as especially domestic economic constraints restrict Turkey’s regional 
influence, so too is Russian resistance a key external factor that prevented the realization 
of Turkish dreams for greater influence. After the collapse of the SU, Russia initially lost 
interest in the new republics for a short time under its pro-Western policy. However, 
reflecting initial misassumptions over Russian leave leading to a power vacuum to be 
filled in the region, by 1993 Russia had moved to reestablish its place within Central Asia 
and Transcaucasus as a dominant actor by formulating its policy of ‘Near Abroad,’
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proclaiming newly independent states as a Russian zone of vital interest. 
(Gokay&Longhorne, 1996:27) Justifying its policy in several ways, including economic 
and security reasons as well as 9.5 million ethnic Russians living in the republics, Russia 
used political, economic and military pressures extensively in order to retain supremacy 
and forestall the spread of Turkish influence. Turkey’s involvement in the region met 
with Russian resistance in the form of Russian overt and covert efforts to become the sole 
mediator in regional conflicts, to compel the concerned states to join and strengthen the 
CIS integration processes and allow for stationing Russian military bases, to press for the 
review of CFE arrangements in the Caucasus, and to control the flow' of Caspian energy 
resources through its territory.
Moscow’s reassertion of Russian dominance over former Soviet republics in 
Transcaucasus and Central Asia with its near abroad foreign policy have not only 
undermined Turkey’s regional goals but also reawakened traditional Turkish perception 
of northern threat as the new Russian activism led to the stationing of Russian troops in 
Armenia and Georgia near the Turkish borders as well as to the enhancement of 
integrationist processes. However, in contrast to Turkish expectations, the US allowed 
Russia to implement its near abroad policy, thereby further undermining Turkey’s stance 
in the region as well as the new republics’ endeavours for real independence. (Olson, 
1995:18-19) Preferring to deal with one nuclear power and seeking stability in the region 
that Russia could provide (Kramer, 1996), the West admitted that the region was actually 
Russia’s backyard and ranked it low in its foreign policy priorities at least until 1996- 
1997. Cullen argued that developments in the region did not affect any vital US or 
Western interests. (Cullen, 1994)
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4.3 Cultural Differences and Problem of Access
According to the Economist, Turkish influence in the region ‘peaked’ in mid- 
1992 and since then “Central Asian states have discovered that their cultural ties with 
Turkey are not as great as they supposed.” (Economist, 1992) Since speculations over 
Turkish-Turkic relationship occurred without looking into practical validity of assertions 
about actual nature of ethnic and religious kinship, and historical relationship, as Carley 
suggested, historical, linguistic and ethic differences could have predicted at the outset 
that “even a closer relationship between the two regions would run into trouble very 
quickly.” (Carley, 1995:170-171) Moreover, Turkey and the newly independent Turkic 
states are not geographically contiguous, putting Turkey at a disadvantage vis-à-vis other 
states such as Iran in terms of developing particularly commercial relations with the 
region. Improved telecommunication linkages and airline connections could only 
partially offset this problem. (Winrow, 1996)
4.4 Turkey’s Foreign Policy Priorities
Despite the real or assumed existence of cultural, ethnic or religious links, 
relations with Turkey and the newly independent Turkic republics have not constituted a 
foreign policy priority for many officials in Ankara. (Winrow, 1998:91) Turkey’s 
position at the juncture of several strategic regions prevents undue concentration on any 
area lest it lose influence in others. (Blank, 1993) Turkey at least could not concentrate 
exclusively on Transcaucasus and Central Asia, and Turkey continued to place its 
relations with the West at top of its foreign policy priority, and secondly maintaining 
balanced and cooperative relations with Russia.
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Russia did not look favourably on Turkey’s efforts to establish and develop 
relations with the new republics. It accused Turkey of pursuing a policy of reviving pan- 
Turkism both among its Muslim-Turkic peoples inside and in the new republics. 
(Naumkin, 1994:181) As the CIS Commander in Chief Marshal Shaposhnikov stated that 
Turkish involvement in Azeri enclave of Nakhichevan would lead to WW III (TDN, 21 
May 1992) based on the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty of May 1992, the prospects 
of Turkey’s collusion course with Russian efforts to recover its former space was 
foremost in the minds of Turkish policy-makers. Although Azeri lobby in Ankara sought 
to convince the government of the need for a Turkish intervention (Abramowitz, 
1993:164), it was quickly learned that Turkey would not sacrifice its international 
prestige for the sake of Turkic brotherhood and mutual sympathies. Following Ozal’s 
death, thee were indications that Turkey started to disengage itself from high level of 
involvement in the region. Despite the rhetoric that 2F' century would be a ‘Turkish 
century,’ Turkey exerted itself not to challenge Russia directly. (Bolukbasi, 1997:81) On 
the one hand, Turkey pursued a controlled policy to spread Turkish influence and to 
strengthen the real independence of the new republics. On the other hand, assuring Russia 
on several occasions that it does not seek to compete for spheres of influence against 
Russia within its sphere of vital interests due to any pan-Turkic aspirations, Turkey did 
not want to alienate Moscow by exerting too much activity in the Central Asian states. 
(Blank, 1994:166)
Kurdish-Chechen questions played an important role in Russian-Turkish relations 
during 1990s. While Russia’s possible loss of control over Chechnya would serve 
Turkish interests by reducing Russian political and military presence in Transcaucasus
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particularly, Kurdish problem weakened Turkey’s foreign policy leverage with Russia to 
utilize the situation. (Olson, 1996:106) Apprehending the dangers of conflictual relations 
with Russia in terms of regional security and stability, and aware of the greater potential 
for economic and military cooperation with Moscow, Turkey moved closer to Russia 
rather than the Turkic republics. Turkey wanted to maintain good relations with Russia 
since business deals and trade between Turkey and the Turkic states in no way matched 
the commercial involvement with Russia, reaching $7 billion in trade (including 
unofficial suitcase trade) and $6 billion in investments. (İskit, 1996) Moreover, despite 
the republics’ clear priority of economics over politics, Turkey had some confusion in its 
foreign policy towards the Turkic republics as Turkish interests focused on political 
considerations rather than economic interests, and the number of signed treaties and 
summit meetings were rate as the criteria of foreign policy success. (Yilmaz, 1994:95) 
But, these produced only declarations full of promises but not concrete mechanisms for 
ensuring greater economic and political collaboration.
4.5 Foreign Policy Priorities of the New Republics
Zviagelskaya argued that due to transitional period and similar restrictions they 
face, differences existing between the Turkic states had practically no effect on their 
foreign policy, and that “first rule of international policy of a small country is that it 
needs a big friend at a distance since friends that are near tend to be oppressive.” 
(Zviagelskaya, 1994:132) Initially the newly independent Turkic republics, lacking 
experience in international politics and unsure of their future, were grateful for Turkish 
offers of political and economic support as Turkey’s stress on commonalties helped them
92
in their search for identity. But then having secured general international recognition and
membership in various international organizations and becoming aware of Turkey’s
limited ability to provide them with financial and technical support, Turkic leaders
“wished to maintain their freedom of manoeuvre and cultivated ties with other states in
the region.” (Winrow, 1998:97) Increasingly more confident Turkic leaderships were
unwilling to bind themselves by giving full commitments to exclusive Turkic formations
as they were eager to secure political and economic support from other international
actors including Russia, Iran, China, South Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Israel as
well as international financial organizations. This further limited Turkey’s influence in
the region given her restricted resources to outflank any potential competitor. In this
perceived competition between rival countries for influence, displaying the images of 19'*'
Great Game, Iran has pursued a pragmatic and realistic policy rather than seeking to
export its revolution, by using its four cards; “Islam, petrodollars, a common ethic,
cultural and linguistic heritage with Farsi-speaking Tajikistan, an extensive, shared
border with Turkmenistan.” (Lipovsky, 1996:221). As Karpat wrote;
"The first and foremost goal of the new national states of Central Asia is the maintenance of their 
independence and territorial integrity and it is the aim of their foreign policy to help achieve this 
goal by using every historical, cultural and strategic-economic leverage available, employing 
whatever new tools come to hand and revitalizing or reshaping older ones to suit current needs.” 
(Karpat, 1992-4:101).
Smolansky wrote in a similar vein:
■‘Central Asian republics will first and above all pursue their own interests as defined by their 
respective leaders...(trying) to extract ma.\imum benefits from all the outsiders and will not 
compromise their national interests in the name of ethnicity, religion or anything else.”
(Smolansky, 1994:306)
Accordingly, Aydin argued,
“they would like to keep all the options open rather than commit themselves too exclusively to one 
connection, be it Turkish or otherwise, and that is the economics, not geography, culture or 
religion which guides their foreign and economic policies.” (Aydin, 1996:167-168)
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Thus, the leaderships of the new republics have been displaying pragmatism and 
prudence in their foreign policies (Rubinstein, 1994) as the diversification of foreign 
political and economic contacts with all other states regardless of ethnic, religious and 
linguistic similarities or differences, seemed to be another means of pursuing the process 
of gradually distancing their countries from the Russian grip. In the search for new 
partners, the primary concern was economic with regional leaders keen to restructure 
their economies so as to increase the living standards and thus eliminate perceived threat 
of political instability. While they seek to play several ethnic and religious cards for these 
goals (Olcott, 1996:5), Central Asian elites proved unwilling to be bound by such 
‘natural’ ties to become dependent on any big brothers (Anderson, 1997:188) because 
they looked for connections that would bolster their newly-won independence rather than 
create a new dependency.
4.6 Nation-Building Processes of the New Republics
Turkic republics, though eager to develop relations with Turkey, wanted to assert 
their independence by diversifying their range of contacts to become full participants in 
international arena rather than junior partners in a grand-Turkic coalition under Turkish 
leadership. (Hunter, 1999:75) Having unexpectedly had independence thrust upon the, 
the elites in the region were accustomed to ruling their own nation-state and the appeal of 
nationhood suggested some restrictions in their relations with Turkey. Despite their 
common Turkic origin, Turkic republics had a strong sense of their distinctiveness, 
preferring to develop and consolidate their own national identity rather than submerged 
within a broader cultural political umbrella (Keskic, 1995:101) as well as direct contacts
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with the outside world rather than using Turkey as an intermediary. As Turkic republics 
sought particularist and individualist ethnic-linguistic identities rather than common ties, 
Turkey’s excessive emphasis on commonalities between the people of Turkey and the 
Turkic-speaking people of the new republics have caused some resentment among them. 
(Aydin, 1996:165) One of Karimov’s speech in 1995 hinted against Turkey as one of 
those struggling to fill ‘the big brother vacancy’ by stating, “as if a vacuum had appeared 
on the territory of the Central Asian region. At that time when we had hardly freed 
ourselves from one Big Brother, others started to act as if to occupy the Big Brother 
vacancy.’’ (Hyman, 1997:349)
Ankara’s initial assumptions regarding its role an ‘elder brother’ to Turkic 
peoples has created problems for Turkey. Turkey’s view was shaped by the general 
perception of its superiority over the more backward ‘outside Turks’ who presumably 
seek Turkish leadership to introduce them to modern world. Although Turkish minorities 
in Bulgaria, Greece, Iraq and Cyprus as a result of their minority status depended on 
Turkish support, it is not the case for the Turkic peoples of Central Asia and Azerbaijan 
who own their own respective states. In reality Muslim-Turkic republics have not been 
wiling to get rid of Russian yoke only to replace it with Turkish yoke. (Bilge, 1995:96) 
Rather than putting themselves in an unequal relationship with a ‘new big brother,’ they 
preferred instead diversifying their foreign relations and pursuing policies in accordance 
with what they assumed to be the best interests of their countries and regimes. (Herzig, 
1995:13) Hence, Kramer wrote;
“What they wanted above all was to reap the fruits of their newly won political sovereignty by 
stabilizing the political and economic independence of their countries as far as possible and thus, 
stabilising at the same time their own domestic position of undisputed leadership.” (Kramer,
1996)
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4.7 Leaderships and Their Dependence on Russia
Another major hindrance to the evolution of stable relationship is the transitional 
nature of the ruling regimes in the new republics. Former communist leaders, Karimov, 
Nazarbaev, Niyazov, Akayev and Aliyev rule their respective countries, and a mass 
politics has yet to emerge, leading to genuine change in domestic and foreign policies. 
With the assumption that career security is the primary motivation of state leaders under a 
two-level structural approach which suggests that the domestic pressures on the 
leadership interact with the structure of international politics (Putnam, 1988), the more 
any leader is held accountable to popular opinion, the more he leans towards Turkey 
since a clever opposition could utilize the popular resentment.
As infrastructural, linguistic, military and economic ties continue to bind these 
new republics to the old centre, Russia indicated that these links established and 
reinforced during the previous century, were more solid than initially suspected. 
Economically former Soviet republics remained dependent on Russia on account of long- 
established trade and transportation links as well as non-realization of new pipeline 
systems.
“Almost 42 percent of Kazakhstan’s exports is purchased by Russia.54 percent of Uzbekistan’s 
experts and imports is to Russia. The ratio is 39 percent in exports and 49 percent in imports for 
Kyrgyzstan. 15 percent of Turkmenistan’s exports is to Russia, but the share of Russia in this 
country’s total imports is almost 45 percent.” (Gum pel, 1998:27)
As in the case of Tajikistan, only Russia proved to overcome the immense logistical and
strategic difficulties of military involvement in the region that is acid test of real
influence there. Fearing the threat of inter-ethic conflicts and the surge of Islamic
fundamentalism that could easily lead to the toppling of their own regimes, Turkic
leaderships wanted to remain part of a loose Russian security umbrella through a residual
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Russian military presence as protection against internal and external challenges to their 
position. The leaderships of the new republics also have to consider the most potential 
source of conflict with Russia, the delicate position of 9.5 million Russians living in the 
region. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan especially, the existence of large Russian and 
Russian-speaking population rules out the possibility of those having an independent 
policy that doe not coincide with Russian interests. (Lipovsky, 1996:223)
Thus, Turkic leaderships have emphasized that development of their relations 
with Turkey would not be at the expense of their long-standing relations with Russia and 
other former Soviet republics. (Hyman, 1994:75) As a result, they generally remained 
lukewarm on some important Turkish foreign policy issues. For instance, Karimov 
warned concerning Nagarno-Karabakh conflict that third parties should not get involved 
even if the non-Turkish side is winning. (H.Hale, 1994:158) Similarly Nazarbaev, not 
wanting parallels to be drawn between the position of Russian minority in northern 
Kazakhstan and that of Turks in Cyprus, refused to sign statements implying the 
recognition of TRNC as an independent state.
4.8 Decline of the Turkish Model
Turkic leaders became less willing to embrace Turkish model of development as a 
further indication of Turkey’s limited influence in the region. Turkish officials have been 
promoting the relevance of Turkish model with little real achievement (Winrow, 
1995:285). As the validity and relevance of Turkish model for the newly independent 
Turkic republics started to be questioned upon recognising important differences existing 
in social structures and value systems between the two regions, the chances for the
97
acceptance of Turkish model depended on its applicability for the new republics,
sociopolitical and economic realities rather than Turkey's international connections or
ideology. It is argued that Turkish model has restrictions in its applicability to the new
republics because they are in the process of state-building after a period of colonial
administration while Turkish state-tradition is deep-rooted and Turkish people have not
suffered under colonialism for long. (Winrow, 1995:26)
Turkey’s vision for the republics created some problems in its relationship with
their existing regimes which became suspicious of Turkey’s democratic rhetoric and
messages because they had the potential to undermine the legitimacy^of authoritarian
Turkic leaderships. Evolution of Uzbekistan’s policy well illustrated this point. Early
1992, Tashkent persistently emphasized its preference for the Turkish model. However,
later Uzbek officials not only became more cautious and worried about political aspects
of Turkish model, but also got irritated over Turkey's arguments to favour more liberal
domestic policies as well as its attempts to establish contacts with some Uzbek
oppositional figures. Contrary to initial expectations of many Turkish and Western
analysis, the new republics have started to examine relative merits of other models such
as Chinese and South Korean whose political and economic systems they consider better
suited their objectives especially because they preferred transition to market economy but
without accompanying political democratization. For this, the danger of proliferation of
ethnic conflicts, fundamentalist and nationalists coming to power, are used to justify a
roolback of democratization. Aydin wrote;
"Despite underlying common problems, each have their distinct charecteristics, thus need to have 
tailor-made,’ rather than ‘ready-made’ models to remedy their own deficiencies...A model which 
is useful for one-state may prove alien and thus unacceptable to another.” (A yd in , 1 9 9 6 :1 6 5 )
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Although the presidents of the Turkic republics clearly stated that they would 
follow the Turkish model, they developed the habit of presenting whichever country they 
visited as a model in an attempt to familiarise themselves with the outside world. 
Realizing Turkey’s domestic problems, economic, political, ethnic or religious, over 
time, they started to want only good parts of the model. Also European rejection of 
Turkey reduced Turkey’s claims to be fully western state, hence making it less attractive 
to the republics. Furthermore, after understanding the real conditions of the region, the 
West reduced its support for the Turkish model because in contrast to initial Western 
assumptions while there was no danger of Iranian fundamentalism gaining ground in the 
region, some Turkish activities and declarations were interpreted as resurgence of pan- 
Turkism. (Bal. 1998)
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CONCLUSION
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of newly independent 
Turkic states in Transcaucasus and Central Asia presented important opportunities and 
challenges for Turkey in terms of defining its role and identity in the emerging 
international system at the close of the century. Turkey has responded to these 
opportunities and challenges by introducing foreign policies that are considerably more 
activist and assertive compared to the past. (Kirisci, 1995:19) After charting a relatively 
predictable course between 1950 and 1991.charecterised as ‘insular and passive’ 
(Makovsky, 1999:93), Turkish foreign policy has entered a new phase in which historical 
and cultural legacies of Turkish-Turkic ethno-cultural world have been revived to exert 
an influence on the direction of Turkish foreign policy. As Turkish policy-makers started 
to focus on wider regional and global concerns rather than a traditional and narrowly 
defined conception of national self-interests. Turkey have actively sought to utilize the 
unique historical opportunity to reestablish and expand its political, economic and 
cultural relations with the Turkic republics at a time when its importance for the West 
was challenged by the implications of momentous changes affecting regional power 
balances and the structure of international system. Despite the earlier assumptions, the 
end of the Cold War was to pave the way for Turkey’s emergence as an important actor 
at the crossroads of several regions, thereby restoring its importance for the West. 
Encouraged initially by the West and the Turkic leaderships, Ankara’s activist foreign 
policy orientation has resulted in several programs aimed at establishing political, 
economic and cultural interdependence between Turkey and the five Turkic republics.
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Particularly initial analysis of Turkey’s active engagement with the former Soviet 
republics speculated that Turkey as a reaction of its exclusion from the EC, was actually 
in search of creating an alternative ‘Commonwealth of Turkic-Speaking World- so that 
such a course would weaken Turkey's European vocation and transform it into an 
"independent regional superpower bent on an Eastern-oriented foreign policy.” (Sander, 
1994:37) However, developments demonstrated that it has not been the case. Turkey’s 
Western-oriented foreign policy have proved to remain still firm, with Turkish policy­
makers continuing to regard the maintenance of close political and economic links with 
the West as essential for Turkey’s national security, economic progress and democratic 
political development. The main feature and objective of Turkish foreign policy during 
the post-Cold War period has been to seek new strategies to prevent its possible isolation 
from the emerging political and economic structures of Europe and at the same time, to 
reassert its importance as a regional power. Namely, national foreign policy goals behind 
shifting Turkish policy behaviour appeared to have remained remarkably constant in that 
an active role in post-Soviet Central Asia and Azerbaijan would bolster Turkey’s 
international image and enhance the prospects of Turkey’s admission to the EU. So, 
Turkey’s active involvement with the Turkic-speaking relations is complementary to its 
Western alignment and cannot be considered as an alternative because it can only 
augment Turkish chances of becoming an integral part of European Common House 
through eventually strengthening regional stability and extending western influence there. 
Moreover, Turkey’s successful overtures in each region reinforce its importance and 
influence for the other.
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At the beginning of 1990s when five Turkic republics gained their independence 
from the former SU, there was a great euphoria and optimism in Turkey that the 21^ 
century would be the century of the Turkic world through the expected establishment of 
cordial relations between Turkey and the new republics on political and economic terms 
in particular. However, after several years have passed since the independence 
declarations of the republics, Turkey has not been able to fully realize its expectations 
despite its assumedly great historical and cultural ties with the region. Initial euphoric 
declarations and expectations have had to be replaced with a realistic understanding that 
self-interests rather than cultural and ethnic solidarity determines foreign policy decisions 
on both sides. Upon recognising the real conditions of the region, the West whose support 
was the main factor for the popularity of the Turkish model for the republics at the 
beginning, followed a pro-Russian policy at the detriment of Turkish interests and initial 
hopes. Moreover, in the face of Turkey's limited capabilities and domestic constraints, 
and the republics’ serious historical and transitory problems as well as their vital interests 
and dependency involved for maintaining balanced relations with Russia, both Turkey 
and the Turkic republics could not formulate independent and decisive steps for 
cooperation among themselves in order not to provoke Russia which had already started 
to threaten them by introducing ‘Near Abroad’ policies.
Creating a sphere of influence means more than just being active in and having 
interests in some region. Although ethnic-historical bonds and cultural relations are not 
dissociated from political and economic relations, gaining an influential position in a 
region depends on more different factors. Engaged in troublesome domestic problems, 
Turkey discovers that influence building is a more costly and complex process than it
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originally expected, upon recognising that limited capabilities mean limited influence. In 
terms of Turkey’s future role and identity, it is not the question of alternatives between a 
European Turkey versus an Asian one as a ‘torn-country,’ as has been supposed by 
Huntington, (Huntington, 1993:42) but rather the role of Turkey as a bridge between 
Europe and the Turkic states, and as an agent of regional cooperation and stability or as a 
‘linchpin’ among several regions that depend to a large extent on whether Turkey can 
eventually sustain a viable and acceptable model because unresolved economic and 
ethnic issues afflicting Turkey make it unattractive both to the East and the West. While 
the new international environment provides opportunities for Turkey, their successful 
exploitation is not automatic, and instead depends on Turkey’s ability to reproduce 
domestic institutions, economic management and consolidation of democracy. Hence 
internal dynamics will determine their translation into a ‘decisive breakthrough.’ (Onis, 
1995:52)
At present, Turkey lacks the means and policy instruments to exploit fully the 
potential gains in Transcaucasus and Cental Asia. Thus, Turkey is bound to seek the slow 
consolidation of its influence in the region for the long-term while strengthening its ties 
with the West because Turkey without strong Western connections cannot exert much 
influence unless it becomes economically and militarily powerful enough. Rather than 
stressing ethno-linguistic nearness to Turkic cousins long-term objective of Turkish 
policy must be to end their dependence on Russia because success of Turkey's overtures 
for influence in the region will depend considerably on the nature of regimes in the 
republics, whose foreign policy orientation depends not so much on ethnic, linguistic or 
religious factors as on the economic and military might and assistance of their
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neighbours. (Lipovsky, 1996:23) While Turkey’s approach towards the republics must 
reflect an awareness of their needs and sensitivities, Turkey should be careful to assure 
that its policy do not have pan-Turkic and domineering big brother implications for them 
but that relations have to based on complete equality.
With the rise of Putin to Russian presidency and his visits to Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan, whose leaders were absent in the last Turkic summit, has sent signals of a 
different Russian policy, which is more aggressive and detrimental to Turkish interests in 
the region. (TON, 2000) as well as some cooling in Turkey’s relations with these Turkic 
states. However, it is important for Turkey to avoid confrontation with Moscow and 
sustain relations with whatever leadership comes to power both in Russia and Turkic 
republics. In particular, Turkey must concentrate political efforts on gradual 
establishment of a network of functional schemes to link the Turkic states to each other 
because regional conflicts between and among them will only mean maintenance of 
Russian dominance against their long-term interests. Russian influence could eventually 
diminish as a result of the construction of new pipelines to Turkey and accession of the 
new democratic leaderships in the republics while Turkey conversely could acquire more 
voice in regional affairs. Thus, despite the “various problems, dashed hopes and lowered 
expectations,” (Winrow, 1995:28) a deeper analysis of Turkey’s current policy vis-à-vis 
the Turkic republics suggests that over the long-term Turkey will undoubtedly achieve, 
though not probably a leadership role, considerable points of leverage and influence upon 
regional developments given the fact that no leadership in Turkey and the Turkic 
republics can dispense ties with each other. Ten years after the end of the Cold War, 
having gone from a peripheral player at the flank to being a central actor at the front.
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Turkey’s main challenge in its foreign policy, however, is still to reconcile various 
interests and aspirations and to strike a balance between continuity and change as well as 
between darins and caution.
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